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This dissertation uses NIDS Wave 4 to simulate past, present and future personal 
income tax progressivity in South Africa. It is divided into two main sections. The first 
section investigates changes in progressivity between tax years 1996 and 2017. Using the 
Kakwani index I find increased progressivity over this time period. However, pre-and 
post-Gini coefficients show decreased progressivity. The second section uses a static, 
arithmetic microsimulation model to simulate two policies aimed at increasing 
progressivity: a negative income tax and increased tax rates for high income earners. 
The negative income tax is shown to significantly reduce inequality, while increased tax 
rates for high income earners have a limited impact. They also have limited potential 
for increasing tax revenue, making it unfeasible to finance the negative income tax 
through such tax increases. A South African negative income tax will either have to be 
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Chapter 1  
Setting the scene 
While the primary function of a personal income tax system is to collect government 
revenue, it also has several other functions. Of special importance to the South African 
context is its mandate to reduce inequality. South Africa has one of the highest levels of 
income inequality in the world, much of which is a direct result of the country’s history 
of colonialism, apartheid, and racial discrimination. Reducing these inequalities have 
been at the centre of much of government policy since the end of apartheid, and the 
progressive personal income tax system together with social grants aimed at low-
income households have played a large role. Yet inequality remains stubbornly high, 
and has even increased, since the end of apartheid in 1994 (Leibbrandt, Finn and 
Woolard, 2012). The most recent estimate of the Gini coefficient of incomes post-taxes 
and -transfers is 0.661. Even with the combination of progressive personal income 
taxation and comprehensive social grants, South Africa’s level of income inequality is 
much higher than other comparable countries (for instance, Brazil’s Gini coefficient 
post-taxes and -transfers is 0.542). This prompts the question of whether - and what - 
more can be done to make the personal income tax system more redistributive. Can it 
be further altered to reduce inequality?  
The degree of progressivity of a tax system reveals not only who bears the burden of tax, 
but also how redistributive the tax system is. A small number of papers have aimed to 
assess progressivity dynamics in post-apartheid South Africa. Nyamongo and Schoeman 
(2007) and Steenekamp (2012b) both aim to assess how the progressivity of the personal 
income tax system over time has changed, while Inchauste et al. (2015) perform a 
comprehensive fiscal incidence analysis of the main tax and transfer programmes in 
South Africa. The results from the papers assessing progressivity over time are 
somewhat ambiguous. While the personal income tax system is shown to be progressive 
                                                          
1 Own estimate from NIDS Wave 4 using the Wave 4 survey weights, years 2014/15. 
2 From Higgins and Pereira’s (2014) calculations based on data for 2008/2009 from Pesquisa de 
Orçamentos Familiares (a family expenditure survey for Brazil). 
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over the time period assessed, the conclusions about year-on-year change in 
progressivity depend on the measures used to assess progressivity. Of the two studies, 
the one by Nyamongo and Schoeman (2007) has more conceptual clarity. They use both 
a redistributive and a disproportionality (Kakwani) measure to assess progressivity 
between 1989 and 2003. Their analysis finds that, using the Kakwani index, progressivity 
increased in 1989-1990 and during the first tax reform phase 1990-1994, but thereafter 
declined. The redistributive effect shows similar results, except for the first tax reform 
phase, where it showed a decline in progressivity. Steenekamp's (2012b) analysis of 
progressivity between 1994 and 2009 shows an overall declining trend in progressivity. 
However, his choice of progressivity measures is c0nfusing. They include the threshold 
at which the top marginal rate applies (as a multiple of the average wage) and the 
difference between the marginal average tax rates. It is therefore not entirely clear what 
he means when he concludes that progressivity has declined. In any case, neither of the 
papers assessing progressivity over time go further than 2009, highlighting the need for 
a more recent analysis of tax progressivity. Inchauste et al. (2015) provide a recent and 
thorough fiscal incidence analysis of the entire tax and transfer system, but for one year 
only. None of the papers include medical deductions and medical aid tax credits in their 
calculations of progressivity measures. Considering the scale of these deductions and 
tax credits, and how much their tax treatment has changed over time, their exclusion 
from calculations is likely to distort the results. 
While an analysis of the historical and present degree of income tax progressivity 
provides context, it does little to advise on future policies for increased progressivity. 
Hence, the aim of this dissertation is two-fold; firstly, to investigate how the 
progressivity of the personal income tax code changed between 1996 and 2017, and 
secondly, to explore whether it can be made more progressive to reduce income 
inequality and poverty. The latter is done by looking at how tax progressivity can be 
increased at the top end of the income distribution through increased marginal tax rates 
for top earners, and at the bottom end through a negative income tax. A negative 
income tax functions as a grant for which the only requirement is income below a 
certain threshold, and its size is proportional to one’s income. Its potential for reaching 
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individuals who are currently excluded from the social welfare system combined with 
its administrative simplicity makes it particularly suitable for the South African context. 
The rest of this chapter describes the data used in this study, followed by a 
comprehensive overview of microsimulation methods and why they are used to achieve 
the aims of this dissertation. Chapter 2 provides context to the rest of the dissertation 
by first summarising the key characteristics of the South African personal income tax 
system. It continues by taking a step back to evaluate the dominant theoretical strand 
in tax literature – optimal income tax theory – and its relevance for tax policy. Chapter 
3 achieves the first aim of the dissertation. It starts with a discussion of different 
progressivity measures and how they impact progressivity evaluations, followed by an 
investigation of the progressivity of the South African personal income tax code 
between 1996 and 2017. Chapters 4, 5, and 6 realise the second aim of the dissertation. 
These chapters move away from the historical perspective of South African tax 
progressivity, and towards its future by investigating potential policies for increasing 
progressivity. Chapter 4 looks at the possibility of a South African negative income tax, 
a policy targeted towards the bottom end of the income distribution. It first reviews 
some of the empirical literature on negative income taxation and then simulates two 
negative income tax proposals. Chapter 5 explores the potential for increasing 
progressivity from the top end of the income distribution. The chapter starts by 
summarising some of the literature on top income taxation, followed by a simulation of 
seven proposals of increased taxation of high income earners. Chapter 6 combines the 
policies from chapters 4 and 5 to explore the impact of a negative income tax financed 
by increased tax rates for high income earners. Chapter 7 discusses the policy 
implications of the results and ends with concluding remarks.  
1.1 Data 
This dissertation uses data from Wave 4 of the National Income Dynamics Survey 
(Southern Africa Labour Research and Development Unit, 2016). NIDS is a national 
longitudinal survey which conducts face-to-face interviews with the same set of 
individuals and the members of their households at the time of each interview. While it 
is a longitudinal survey consisting of four waves, each wave can be treated as a cross-
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section of the South African population. This is because the waves have been "separately 
calibrated to the corresponding population totals as given in the mid-year populations 
estimates [by StatsSA] released in 2015"  (Chinhema et al. 2016, p.59). Wave 4 of NIDS 
was collected from September 2014 to August 2015. Given the small numbers of high 
income earners in the dataset and that NIDS is a longitudinal survey (in which one may 
expect high income households to either be under sampled or have higher rates of 
attrition), it is important to view the results based on the top end of the income 
distribution with a degree of scepticism. These earners would perhaps be better 
captured by tax data. 
In order to undertake the analysis in this dissertation, the ideal dataset would include 
information on yearly gross taxable incomes and tax liability for a nationally 
representative sample. However, there is no current dataset which provides this. This 
dissertation therefore uses two different data sources to simulate a similar dataset. 
Income data from NIDS is used to construct a taxable income variable, and tax codes 
from yearly budget reports are applied to this variable to create net incomes for each 
tax year. NIDS is particularly useful for constructing a taxable income variable since it 
includes very detailed information about individual incomes, allowing one to exclude 
income sources which are not presently taxed through the personal income tax (e.g. 
inheritance). 
The sample is restricted to households for whom there exists income data for at least 
one person. An aggregated taxable income variable is constructed for these households.3 
The taxable income variable consists of total yearly income from employment, profit 
shares, and bonuses. It does not include income from social grants, UIF payments, 
lobola and inheritance.4 Since the individual income measures that make up the taxable 
income variable are all measured from the previous month while the tax variables are 
                                                          
3While the NIDS data does provide an aggregated income measure at the household level, the 
tax code can only be applied to individual level income data. Furthermore, the aggregated 
income measure includes income sources that are not taxed through the personal income tax, 
making it unsuitable for this purpose. 
4While there is no inheritance tax in South Africa, there is an estate tax. Including income 
from inheritance in taxable income would therefore mean taxing the estate/inheritance twice. 
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yearly, the taxable income variable is multiplied by 12 to construct a yearly variable. This 
comes with the caution that one-off income sources or months that deviate from a 
“representative” month may lead to bias in yearly earnings for some households and 
individuals. Because the purpose of the taxable income variable is to simulate a pre-tax 
scenario, the taxable income variable is “grossed up” (since the NIDS income variables 
are net of tax). This is done by applying the 2016 tax code (The National Treasury of 
South Africa, 2016), which covers 1 March 2015 to 29 Feb 2016, to the net taxable incomes 




      (1.1) 
   
where  𝑔 =  𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒, and 
 𝑛 =  𝑛𝑒𝑡 𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 
𝑟 =  𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝑟𝑒𝑏𝑎𝑡𝑒 (𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝) 
𝑓𝑡 = 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝑏𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡 
𝑡𝑖 = 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ 𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝑏𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡 
𝐿 = 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ 𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝑏𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡 
Additionally, since the base tax year is 2016, the medical and medical aid deductions 
relevant for this year are applied in reverse to ensure that the gross taxable income 
variable corresponds to the gross income from which tax liability is calculated. 
Naturally, this set-up is less complex than the actual system for deductions and 
exceptions, which also include things such as pension fund contributions and 
contributions to retirement annuity funds. For simplicity, these are not included in this 
analysis. This final gross taxable income variable is the base variable to which the tax 
rules are applied. 
Chapter 3 investigates the change in progressivity of the personal income tax code over 
time and therefore uses a constructed dataset of yearly net incomes as mentioned above. 
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This dataset is constructed by first subtracting medical deductions from the base gross 
taxable income variable 𝑔, creating a dataset of gross taxable incomes for each year. 
Then, the tax codes for each year are applied to their respective gross taxable income 
variables, using equation 1.2 (the reverse of equation 1.1):  
𝑛 = 𝑔(1 − 𝑡𝑖) + 𝑟 − 𝑓𝑡 + 𝑡𝑖 ∗ 𝐿   (1.2) 
In the case where gross income is below the tax threshold(s), 𝑛 = 𝑔. The tax codes are 
gathered from the Budget Reviews for tax years 1996-20175 (Department of Finance, 
1995-1997, The National Treasury of South Africa, 1998-2016). Information on medical 
aid tax credits and other medical deductions are gathered from the National Budget 
Reviews, as well as tax guides from SARS (South African Revenue Service, 2004-2016). 
The South African personal income tax code contains marginal rates as well as fixed 
amounts and tax rebates, which are given in Rands. Because the tax codes are applied 
to the 2014/15 NIDS dataset, the Rand amounts in other years have been adjusted for 
inflation to 2015 prices using CPI data from Statistics South Africa (2017a). 
Chapters 4, 5, and 6 use the gross taxable income 𝑔 for 2016 to calculate eligibility for 
the negative income tax and liability for paying tax. The resulting changes in their net 
incomes are then fed back into their household incomes as measured by 𝑤4_ℎℎ𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 
in the NIDS dataset. This is done to analyse the proposed policies’ impact on poverty 
and inequality in the full population rather than just the taxpaying population. All 
poverty and inequality calculations are done on per capita household incomes. 
1.2 Microsimulation for policy analysis 
This dissertation uses a static, arithmetic microsimulation model to investigate 
proposed changes to South Africa’s personal income tax code. More specifically, the 
model used is a tax-benefit model. The following section explains what 
microsimulations are and the reasons they are used in this dissertation. It further gives 
                                                          
5 It should be noted that tax years go from March to February, i.e. tax year 1996 starts 1 March 
1995 and ends 28 February 1996. 
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an overview of the use of tax-benefit microsimulation models in South Africa and 
abroad, concluding with a summary of the specific model used in this dissertation. 
Microsimulation models consist of three key components: a micro-dataset with 
economic and socio-demographic information about the economic agents, the policy 
rules that one wants to investigate (in this paper, the tax code), and a theoretical model 
of agents’ behavioural response (Bourguignon and Spadaro, 2006). The behavioural 
response model is what separates the different types of microsimulation models – an 
arithmetic microsimulation model6 assumes no behavioural response to policy, while a 
behavioural microsimulation model incorporates behavioural response functions. One 
can further distinguish between static and dynamic microsimulation models. Static 
models exist in one time period only, while dynamic models incorporate a time 
dimension where agents age as time passes and therefore can incorporate more 
advanced decision-making (Bourguignon and Spadaro, 2006). As noted in Wilkinson 
(2009), a dynamic microsimulation model must include some sort of behavioural effect, 
but it differs from a behavioural model in that the behavioural change is due to ageing, 
rather than policy change. 
Microsimulation models allow for a comprehensive ex-ante evaluation of policy 
suggestions as they make it simple to simulate a policy change and create counterfactual 
scenarios (Figari, Paulus and Sutherland, 2015). They are therefore extensively used by 
public policy researchers as well as by government. Typically, they are used to evaluate 
how changes in policies affect the distribution of income and other microeconomic 
measures (Figari, Paulus and Sutherland, 2015). They can also be integrated with 
macroeconomic models in ‘micro-macro’ approaches and be applied to a wider range of 
scenarios (Bourguignon and Spadaro, 2006).  
                                                          
6 The arithmetic microsimulation model is often referred to as a “static” microsimulation 
model. However, to avoid any confusion with static (as opposed to dynamic) microsimulation 
models, this paper uses the arithmetic/behavioural distinction used in Bourguignon and 
Spadaro (2006) to refer to non-behavioural and behavioural models. 
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The simulations rely on existing relationships between the variables within the datasets, 
such as the relationships between income and demographic factors. This makes it 
simple to investigate the underlying mechanisms behind any policy result  (Woolard et 
al., 2005). For instance, the number of women who will receive a subsidy though a 
negative income tax policy will be a result of the underlying relationship between 
income and gender in the dataset. Similarly, given that the sample is nationally 
representative, microsimulation models can be used to calculate aggregate costs and 
benefits of policy suggestions (Bourguignon and Spadaro, 2006). Using micro-datasets 
with comprehensive information about its economic agents has several advantages, 
including that it allows the model to take into account the full heterogeneity in the 
population and therefore provide very detailed analysis of a policy suggestion (Woolard 
et al., 2005). Furthermore, it allows for an analysis of the impact of policies, not only on 
the population as a whole, but also within different sub-populations and individuals 
(Wright, Noble and Dinbabo, 2012). It is important to note, however, that the quality 
and applicability of a microsimulation fundamentally relies on the quality of its dataset. 
A good microsimulation model must have data of a certain size and detail which is not 
always available, particularly in a developing country context.  
Since this paper looks specifically at tax policies, the model used is a tax-benefit 
microsimulation model. A tax-benefit model allows one to simulate the potential tax 
policies by applying tax codes to the incomes of the representative individuals in the 
sample. From this, one can investigate how various tax policies will affect poverty and 
income inequality in both the population as a whole, as well as in different 
subpopulations and income percentiles. A challenge of using microsimulation models 
instead of tax data to assess the effects of tax policy changes is that the microsimulation 
models cannot account for what taxpayers actually pay in tax (or receive in grants), but 
can only model what they ought to have paid or received. Not modelling grant uptake 
and tax evasion/avoidance may lead to inaccurate conclusions about the impact of tax 
policies (Woolard et al., 2005). Nevertheless, tax-benefit microsimulation models have 
been used extensively to model tax policies in OECD countries, with a notable example 
being EUROMOD, a microsimulation model which covers all EU28 countries 
(Sutherland and Figari, 2013). The framework for EUROMOD has also been used to 
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create tax-benefit microsimulation models for non-EU countries such as Russia 
(Popova, 2012) and Serbia (Ranđelović and Rakić, 2013). Tax-benefit microsimulation 
models are also increasingly developed for developing countries. Brazil (Immervoll et 
al., 2006) and Namibia (Wright, Noble and Barnes, 2014) already have tax-benefit 
microsimulation models, and SOUTHMOD, the collective name for a group of 
microsimulation models in developing countries (mostly in Africa) based on the 
EUROMOD framework, is currently being developed (UNU-WIDER, 2017).  
Tax-benefit microsimulation models have also been used in the South African context 
to evaluate personal income taxation and the tax system more generally. Notably, 
SAMOD is a static tax-benefit microsimulation model based on EUROMOD, whose 
newest iteration is underpinned by both the Living Conditions Survey 2008/09 
(Statistics South Africa, 2011) and Wave 4 of NIDS (Southern Africa Labour and 
Development Research Unit, 2016) (Wright et al., 2016). In academic research, SAMOD 
has been used to evaluate existing policies, such as the child grant (Dinbabo, 2011) and 
the impact of the tax-benefit system as a whole on child poverty (Wilkinson, 2011). It 
has also been used to simulate potential policies: in particular, Ntshongwana, Wright 
and Noble (2010) use SAMOD to evaluate three hypothetical social grants, including a 
grant for primary caregivers, and an income replacement grant for low income earners. 
Others, including Woolard et al. (2005), use microsimulation to evaluate the 
redistributive impact of taxation, and Inchauste et al. (2015) similarly evaluate the 
impact of the main tax and social transfer systems on inequality. Others who have 
constructed tax-benefit microsimulation models include Wilkinson (2009), Thompson 
and Schoeman (2006), and Van Heerden (2013). While tax-benefit microsimulation 
models have been used to assess the impact of a negative income tax in other countries 
(see for instance Colombino et al., 2008; Narazani and Shima, 2008; Abul Naga, 
Kolodziejczyk and Mueller, 2008), the closest model in the South African context is a 
micro-macro simulation model by Magnani and Badaoui (2015), which evaluates a type 
of negative income tax.  
As with most South African tax-benefit microsimulation models, the microsimulation 
model used in this paper is a static, arithmetic model. The decision to use a static 
10 
 
microsimulation model is made firstly because it is the simplest and most transparent 
method, as noted in Wilkinson (2009). However, it is also because results from a 
dynamic model will be “very sensitive to the robustness of the model of behavioural 
response” (Wilkinson, 2009, p.5) that is used. While NIDS provides longitudinal data 
that could potentially be used to construct a behavioural response model to changes 
over time, doing so is beyond the scope of this study. The microsimulation model used 
in this paper is also an arithmetic model. This is simply because there is no reliable 
model in South Africa for behavioural responses to taxation, whether they are labour 
supply responses, tax avoidance, or evasion. Since microsimulation results are sensitive 
to the assumptions of their models, adding a behavioural response to the model would 
make the results unreliable at best. Not including a behavioural response is not as 
restrictive as it would seem – it simply means that the model being used measures the 
first round effects of policy change (Bourguignon and Spadaro, 2006, p.80). However, 
not including behavioural responses to changes in tax policy may impact the realism of 
the microsimulation estimates. Firstly, if there is a significant behavioural response to a 
change in tax policy, the effectiveness of the policy (in reducing inequality or poverty, 
for instance) may be greatly over- or underestimated in a non-behavioural model. 
Secondly, if there is a significant behavioural response, the cost or revenue predictions 
from a policy will be unreliable (Wilkinson, 2009). Thirdly, as noted in Woolard et al. 
(2005), a complete assessment of a tax policy ought to include both equity and efficiency 





Chapter 2  
Personal income tax in South Africa and 
optimal income tax theory 
This chapter aims to provide context for the following chapters’ discussions of the 
progressivity of the personal income tax. It does so by first taking a step back to look at 
an important theoretical strand of tax literature, optimal income tax theory. Chapter 2.1 
looks at the Mirrlees model and its extensions, and discusses why optimal income tax 
theory can help frame the problem of how to set tax rates. Bringing the discussion back 
to actual tax systems, this is followed by an overview of the South African personal 
income tax in chapter 2.2. 
2.1 Optimal income tax theory 
The following sub-chapter takes a step back to look at some of the taxation literature 
within economics. More specifically, the focus is put on the optimal income tax theory, 
which has long been the dominant strand of tax theory in economics. James Mirrlees 
(1971) was a pioneer in this field. In his influential model, the government wishes to 
maximise social welfare given a set tax revenue that it wants to collect. The optimal tax 
selection in a society depends on three key factors: its value of equity and fairness, the 
distribution of skills in the population, and individuals’ behavioural response to 
taxation. Society’s value of equity and fairness is captured by the social welfare function, 
which in Mirrlees’ model takes the form of additive individual utilities. The distribution 
of skills in the population is imperfectly proxied by the income distribution, while the 
population’s labour-consumption preferences determine the behavioural response 
function. In the classical Mirrlees model, the optimal tax schedule is almost linear, but 
Mirrlees noted that for bureaucratic simplicity, policymakers may opt for a linear tax 
schedule. The highest marginal tax rates come in at relatively low incomes, and decline 
thereafter. These results come with an important caveat: societies with high skills 
inequality may necessitate a more redistributive tax system than societies with low 
levels of skills inequality, as the redistributive benefits would dominate the reduced 
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work incentives. In this situation, the tax schedule would look very different. This point 
is typically overlooked in the optimal tax literature following Mirrlees.  
There are many extensions of the Mirrlees model aiming to account for different 
realities of the labour market. Some include restrictions on the workers, such as 
imperfect information or limited choice in labour supply. In Diamond (1980), workers 
are limited to choose their labour supply on the extensive margin only - they can work 
full time or not at all. Non-workers may receive income support. In maximising welfare, 
there is a trade-off between incentives to work and the social utility of consumption, 
and subsidisation of low income earners may be optimal. Diamond's (1980) model has 
special relevance for low income earners for whom the labour supply choice is often on 
the extensive margin (Saez, 2002). In Eaton and Rosen (1980), workers face uncertain 
wages at the moment of deciding their labour supply, and have to make a decision based 
on the subjective probability distributions of their wages. The optimal tax rate is higher 
than in a model without uncertainty.  
Other models extend the Mirrlees model to account for the complex choices facing the 
worker in the labour market. In Kapicka (2006), human capital is endogenous. In this 
model, tax distorts incentives for human capital accumulation for two reasons. The first 
reason is due to the dynamic nature of human capital. If agents discount future 
consumption, it is already difficult for government to create incentives for human 
capital accumulation and it will want to be careful to decrease them by increased tax 
rates. The second reason comes from the assumption that abler people both invest more 
in human capital and work more, making their output of non-leisure time strictly 
convex, and thus more sensitive to tax distortions. Hence, since taxation distorts both 
labour incentives and incentives for investing in human capital, the optimal tax rate is 
lower than in a model with exogenous human capital. Kleven, Kreiner, and Saez (2009) 
model optimal taxation for couples with interdependent labour supplies. The couple’s 
primary earner chooses labour supply on the intensive margin and therefore chooses 
how many hours to work, while the secondary earner chooses on the extensive margin, 
i.e. whether to work or not. They find that if the secondary earner’s decision to work is 
a signal of the household being better off, the optimal tax schedule would suggest a 
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positive tax on the secondary earner. If their decision to work is a signal of the household 
being worse off, however, it suggests that a positive subsidy should be put on the 
secondary earner. 
Lastly, some extensions of the optimal tax theory include threats to the sustainability of 
the tax system. Simula and Trannoy (2010) allow high income individuals to emigrate to 
avoid taxation, which introduces a participation element into the model. This results in 
a decreased, sometimes negative, optimal tax rate compared to a world without 
migration. Similarly, Rothschild and Scheuer (2011) propose a model where agents can 
choose between participating in a “traditional sector” and a crowdable “rent-seeking” 
sector. In marked contrast to Piketty, Saez, and Stantcheva (2011), who advocate higher 
tax rates to combat rent-seeking, Rothschild and Scheuer (2011) conclude that taxes 
should remain modest. Their argument is that a lower tax rate will increase rent-seeking 
efforts, which ensures a crowded rent-seeking sector with low private returns from 
rents-seeking. This again discourages others from entering. However, their argument is 
entirely dependent on the, perhaps unrealistic, assumption that the rent-seeking sector 
is crowdable with decreasing private returns. 
There is also a considerable macro strand of optimal taxation literature, which will not 
be discussed in detail in this sub-chapter (a review of this literature can be found in 
Golosov, Tsyvinski, and Werning (2007)). Its main contribution has been to introduce 
a dynamic element to the theory by assuming that individuals live for t periods of time 
and have stochastically evolving skills (Golosov et al., 2010). An oft-cited limitation of 
the macro approach is that its resulting optimal tax systems tend to be very complex 
with little application to policy recommendations (Piketty and Saez, 2013). 
Critique of optimal tax theory 
While optimal tax theory has dominated the tax literature for decades, it has not 
remained unchallenged. Some of its main criticisms are that the added-utility social 
welfare function is unsuitable for calculating optimal tax schemes, that it ignores 
implementation costs and feasibility concerns, and that its results are not robust.  
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The difficulty in selecting the appropriate social welfare function was acknowledged by 
Mirrlees himself, who stated that 
“… unless there are stronger cases for some welfare functions than for others, the 
formal derivation of properties of welfare-maximizing policies is a pointless 
exercise” (Mirrlees, 1986, p.1198–99).  
The added-utility social welfare function is problematic for several reasons, including 
that individuals’ marginal utility of consumption is unobservable. Additionally, as noted 
by Piketty and Saez (2013), the utilitarian approach tends to conflict both with existing 
tax systems and perceptions of redistributive justice. It treats income earned by effort 
and luck identically, gives transfers to low-income individuals whether they work or 
not, and recommends that all characteristics correlated with earnings should be tagged 
for differential tax rates (including “odd”  characteristics like height, as mentioned by 
Salanié (2011)). Alternative social welfare functions have been suggested. Rawls’ max-
min criterion where the welfare of the worst-off in society is maximised is particularly 
popular (Sadka, 1976). Piketty and Saez (2013) also explore other alternatives, including 
the Pareto principle, libertarianism, “principles of responsibility and compensation” 
(Piketty and Saez, 2013, p.71), and equal opportunity principles. An interesting 
suggestion comes from Saez and Stantcheva (2016), who propose replacing the standard 
social welfare weights with “generalized social marginal welfare weights” which reflect 
“society’s concerns for fairness without being necessarily tied to individuals” (Saez and 
Stantcheva, 2016, p.24). While this is admittedly a vague proposal, their point is that the 
weights could be determined by social justice principles (for instance the Rawls’ max-
min criterion), leading to a normative theory of taxation. 
Adding to concerns about the social welfare function is the critique that optimal income 
tax theory does not address implementation costs or feasibility concerns, limiting its 
usefulness for policy recommendations. Joel Slemrod is perhaps the most unwavering 
critic in this regard, but similar sentiments can be found in Salanié (2011). Slemrod’s 
main criticism of the optimal income tax theory is that it neither accounts for the 
existence of tax evasion and avoidance, nor the large implementation costs of collecting 
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taxes (Slemrod, 1990). Similarly, Salanié (2011) points out that the implicit assumption 
of a benevolent planner who can determine tax rates as they please is unrealistic - it 
both ignores any political economy concerns of taxation, and assumes that the tax 
system can be immediately and drastically altered.  
Lastly, the lack of robust results from optimal income tax theory further limits its 
usefulness for tax policy. In particular, results are not robust to changes in social welfare 
functions, individual preferences, and distribution of ability, resulting in few 
overarching conclusions (Creedy, 2009b). Additionally, as Creedy (2009a) notes, 
optimal tax models tend to simulate tax policies on small homogenous populations, 
which makes them ill-suited to capture population heterogeneity. He suggests that 
other methods, such as behavioural microsimulation and other empirical research, may 
be more useful for tax analysis. 
However, Creedy (2009a) also provides a useful perspective on how to think about the 
lessons from optimal income tax theory. He notes that 
“The extensive optimal tax literature does not provide ... clear guidance, but instead 
has clarified the precise way in which the optimal tax system depends on a wide 
range of factors, some of which relate to value judgements while others concern 
behavioural responses or  basic conditions, such as abilities, which display 
considerable heterogeneity in practice.” (p.503-504) 
Perhaps the strength of optimal tax theory lies in its ability to concisely formulate the 
problem of selecting a system of taxation in which a number of concerns pulls in 
different directions. Using Mirrlees’ framework of considering inequality, behavioural 
reactions to taxation, and a (suitable) social welfare function may prove very beneficial 
if the lessons from optimal taxation’s critics are also incorporated.  
2.2 Personal income tax in South Africa 
Having discussed the optimal tax literature and its significance for actual policy, we can 
move on to discussing the actual personal income tax system in South Africa. Personal 
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income tax is the largest component of South Africa’s tax revenue. In 2014/15, it 
contributed 36.4% of total tax revenue and was 9.2% the size of GDP (National Treasury 
and South African Revenue Service, 2016). Personal income tax is levied on taxable 
income7 of individuals and trusts. For most individuals, taxable income is received as 
salaries, wages, pensions or annuity payments, and investment income (The National 
Treasury of South Africa and South African Revenue Service, 2016).  Individuals are 
required to pay tax  if they earn more than R75 000 a year if they are below 65 years old8 
(The National Treasury of South Africa, 2016). Effectively, this means that a large share 
of the South African population earns less than the tax threshold and is not liable to pay 
personal income tax. The structure of personal income tax is progressive, with marginal 
tax rates varying between 18% and 41%, as seen in table 2.1. The combination of these 
two factors means that a small minority of the population pays the majority of the tax. 
Table 2.2 shows that the top 10(20) percent of the income distribution pays 86.9(97.5) 
percent of personal income tax. Hence, in constructing the present South African 
personal income tax system, special attention has been given to inequality reduction. 
The next chapter will investigate how this has changed over time by measuring 
progressivity of the personal income tax in the years 1995-2016. 
  
                                                          
7 Taxable income consists of gross income minus exemptions and deductions.  




Table 2.1 Tax rates for individuals – 2017 tax year 
Source: Budget Review 2016 (The National Treasury of South Africa, 2016) 
 
Table 2.2 Market income distribution and concentration shares of personal income tax 
Source: Inchauste et al. (2015) 
  
Taxable income (R) Rates of tax (R) 
0 – 188 000 18% of taxable income 
188 001 – 293 600 33 840 + 26% of taxable income above 188 000 
293 601 – 406 400 61 296 + 31% of taxable income above 293 600 
406 401 – 550 100 96 264 + 36% of taxable income above 406 400 
550 101 – 701 300 147 996 + 39% of taxable income above 550 100 
701 301 and above 206 964 + 41% of taxable income above 701 300 
 
Rebates 
Primary R13 500 
Secondary R7 407 
Tertiary R2 466 
 
Tax thresholds  
Below age 65 R75 000 
Age 65 and over R116 150 
Age 75 and over  R129 850 
Decile  Market income Personal income taxes 
1 0.1 % 0.0% 
2 0.2% 0.0% 
3 0.5% 0.0% 
4 0.8% 0.0% 
5 1.5% 0.0% 
6 2.7% 0.1% 
7 4.5% 0.4% 
8 8.3% 2.0% 
9 17.7% 10.6% 
10 63.7% 86.9% 
18 
 
Chapter 3  
Progressivity in South Africa’s personal 
income tax, 1996-2017 
This chapter investigates how the progressivity in South Africa’s personal income tax 
changed between 1996 and 2017. To do this, it is first necessary to define what is meant 
by progressivity and how it can be measured. Chapter 3.1 discusses different 
progressivity measures and the decisions that must be made in deciding on which 
progressivity measures to use. It finishes with a closer look at the Kakwani index and 
how it has been used in the South African tax literature. Chapter 3.2 briefly describes 
the methodology used in this chapter to assess progressivity changes, while chapter 3.3 
presents the results.  
3.1 Measuring progressivity 
In the optimal tax literature, progressivity is implicitly rather than explicitly addressed. 
This is in the sense that the relative tax burden of income groups and the composition 
of tax is decided, but rarely with a focus on progressivity in itself. But in this analysis it 
is necessary to make explicit the meaning of tax progressivity. In the general sense, a tax 
system is progressive if the percentage of income paid in taxes increases with income. 
However, it is often unclear how one should measure the degree of progressivity, or how 
progressivity can be compared between countries or over time. In the academic 
literature, a number of progressivity measures exist. Therefore, to avoid confusion and 
ensure replicability of results, it is important in any analysis of tax progressivity to 
specify which measure(s) one is using and why.  
There have traditionally been two main types of progressivity measures: local and global 
measures. Local measures of tax progression use only the properties of the tax schedule 
to determine progressivity, but disregard the income distribution it is applied to (Seidl, 
2009). Examples of local progressivity measures are the tax elasticity and the residual 
income elasticity (Jakobsson, 1976). As noted by Seidl (2009), the biggest limitation of 
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the local measures of tax progression is that they measure progressivity independently 
of the income distribution. This ignores the issue that changes to the income 
distribution can alter how progressive a tax is, even if the tax code remains unchanged. 
As an example, consider a situation where the tax code remains constant, while the 
incomes of high income earners increase relative to the rest of the distribution. If they 
are subject to the same tax rates as before, their proportion of total tax paid in society 
will have decreased, implying a decrease in progressivity. 
Global progressivity measures use both the distribution of tax liability and the 
distribution of incomes to calculate progressivity. They can therefore easily be 
graphically illustrated using Lorenz and tax distribution curves, as seen in Figure 1 
below. 
 
The most basic global measure is the one by Reynolds and Smolensky (1977), which is 
simply the difference between the distribution of gross and net incomes (i.e. the area 
between the Lorenz curve L(X) and the tax distribution curve T(X)). The Reynolds-
Smolensky index is also often referred to as the “redistributive effect”. The other global 
measures are mostly extensions of this measure. Two widely used global progressivity 
measures are the Suits index (Suits, 1977) and the Kakwani index (Kakwani, 1977). Of 
these, the Kakwani index is the most widely used. Simply put, the Kakwani index – often 
T(X) 
L(X) 
% of population 
% of income  
Figure 3.1 Lorenz and tax distribution curves 
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referred to as the disproportionality index – measures the difference between convexity 
of the Lorenz curve L(X) and the tax distribution curve T(X). A benefit of the Kakwani 
index is that, unlike the Reynolds-Smolensky index, it is scale invariant (Thoresen, 
2004). Recently, Stroup (2005) suggested an alternative global measure, which instead 
of measuring the difference, measures the ratio of convexity of the Lorenz and the tax 
distribution curves (Stroup and Hubbard, 2013). The global tax measures have the 
advantage of being applicable to different tax systems and income distributions, which 
makes intertemporal and between-country comparisons possible. However, as pointed 
out by Pogorelskiy, Seidl and Traub (2010, p.1), aggregating across the whole income 
distribution can lead to counterintuitive results – for instance, a tax system which is 
regressive over certain intervals may be considered more progressive than a tax which 
is progressive across the distribution.  
There are also other, less orthodox, methods for assessing progressivity. Piketty and 
Saez (2006) compare the before-and-after tax incomes of different income deciles to 
show that higher earning individuals pay a larger percentage of their incomes in taxes 
than others. However, their interpretation of these results is less rigorous. As critiqued 
by Stroup and Hubbard (2013), they do not have a clear way to measure changes in 
progressivity. Instead, they use the change in tax rates for the top 1% of income earners 
as an indication of changes in progressivity overall. Stroup and Hubbard emphasise that 
ignoring the changes for rest of the income distribution is problematic for their 
conclusions about progressivity: Piketty and Saez’s claim that progressivity declined 
between 1960 and 2004 because tax rates for the top 1% declined ignores the fact that 
the 20th-40th percentiles experienced lower tax rates in the same period. Unless the 
weighting of high versus low income earners is made clear, it is highly problematic to 
assess progressivity based on changes for specific income groups. Kakinaka and Pereira 
(2006) propose an alternative progressivity measure which differs strongly from other 
measures in the literature. They use macro data to create a progressivity measure based 
on the relative volatility of tax revenue and aggregate income (Kakinaka and Pereira, 
2006). While this is undeniably a clever approach which carries the advantage of using 
data that is easier to get hold of – in particular in countries with less access to good 
micro data – it ultimately does not provide any insight into the income distribution and 
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tax structure, reducing its relevance for a dissertation like this. Lastly, Pogorelskiy, Seidl 
and Traub (2010) suggest a new progressivity measure which they refer to as “uniform 
tax progression for different income distributions”. Their methodology allows one to 
compare tax progressivity using dominance relations of different income distributions.  
There is no obvious answer as to which tax progressivity measure is best. Mostly, it 
depends on which situation is being assessed – whether the income distribution is fixed, 
whether one is comparing between countries, and so on. The literature discussing tax 
progressivity and targeting of transfers in the South African context (Inchauste et al., 
2015; van der Berg, 2009; Nyamongo and Schoeman, 2007;  Van Heerden and Schoeman, 
2010; Steenekamp, 2012b), have, when using specific measures of progressivity, mostly 
used the Kakwani index. This is likely for several reasons, in particular because it is a 
simple and intuitive tool for comparing tax progressivity over time and between 
countries. The Kakwani index has been used in South Africa both to compare changes 
in progressivity within South Africa over time, but also to compare its progressivity with 
that of other countries. Nyamongo and Schoeman (2007) assess the change in 
progressivity of personal income tax in South Africa between 1989 and 2003, and find 
that, using the Kakwani index, progressivity increased between 1989 and 1990 and 
during the first phase of reform programmes 1990-1994, but decreased in the second 
phase of tax reform programmes. The findings are the same if using a redistributive 
progressivity measure, except for in the first phase of reform, where this measures shows 
a decrease in progressivity. This is interesting to note because it highlights that 
conclusions about progressivity depend explicitly on which measure is being used, and 
that results from different progressivity measures can be contradictory.  
To the best of my knowledge, there have been no studies assessing the change in 
progressivity of personal income tax in South Africa after 2003, but Inchauste et al. 
(2015) provides an international comparison of progressivity (as measured by the 
Kakwani index) of the personal income tax and payroll tax combined . Comparing South 
Africa, Brazil and Mexico, they find that the countries’ Kakwani indices are 0.13, 0.27 
and 0.30, respectively. They explain that the large differential between South Africa and 
the two other countries stems from South Africa’s higher inequality combined with a 
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lower tax progressivity at the bottom end of the income distribution. If the Kakwani 
index would have been calculated on the total system of income tax and transfers, the 
latter effect and the differential might be lower.  
3.2 Methodology: progressivity 1996-2017 
To assess the progressivity of personal income tax over time, chapter 3.3 starts with a 
graphic simulation of how the net incomes of representative taxpayers have changed. 
Specifically, this entails that the personal income tax code9 of years 1996 to 2017 will be 
applied to representative taxpayers with gross earnings of R1 000 000, R500 000, 
R250 000, and R100 000, assuming that their gross income was constant over this time 
period. Medical aid tax credits and deductions are not included in these illustrations of 
net incomes as their sizes depend on other factors than income, which may affect their 
interpretation. While these illustrations do not show changes in overall progressivity, 
they provide a visual starting point for further discussions. To disaggregate the 
underlying factors behind progressivity change over this period, chapter 3.3 further 
analyses the changes in marginal tax rates, tax liability thresholds, and tax treatment of 
medical expenses and medical aid contributions. 
Lastly, chapter 3.4 calculates overall progressivity for the years in question. This is done 
using the dataset of net incomes for years 1995 to 2016, whose construction was 
explained in chapter 1.1. Since we do not have the income distributions for each of these 
years, the underlying income distribution of these datasets comes from Wave 4 of NIDS. 
The progressivity calculations therefore assume that the income distribution for all 
years is identical to that of 2015, and the results should therefore be interpreted as the 
progressivity of the tax code, rather than of the tax system. The changes in overall 
progressivity are calculated using pre- and post-tax Gini coefficients as well Kakwani 
indices for the different years. The Gini coefficients illustrate to what extent personal 
income tax is effective in reducing income inequality, while the Kakwani index gives a 
measure of how progressive the tax system is in a given year. While Gini coefficients are 
                                                          
9 The tax codes and brackets have all been adjusted to 2015 Rands 
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well-known, the section below aims to give a more detailed description of the Kakwani 
index and how it should be interpreted. 
The Kakwani index (Kakwani, 1977) is the difference between the concentration index 
of taxes (Ct) and the Gini index of before-tax incomes (Gx)10 (shown in equation 3.1). 
𝐾 = 𝐶𝑡 − 𝐺𝑥       (3.1) 
Ct is defined as one minus twice the area under the concentration curve (Jenkins, 1988), 
i.e.  
𝐶𝑡 = 1 − 2 ∫ 𝐹𝑖[𝑡(𝑥)]𝑑𝐹(𝑥)
𝑥
0
     (3.2) 
Gx is defined as one minus twice the area under the Lorenz curve, i.e.  
𝐺𝑥 = 1 − 2 ∫ 𝐹𝑖(𝑥)𝑑𝐹(𝑥)
𝑥
0
     (3.3) 
The Kakwani index can therefore be shown to be twice the area between the tax 
concentration curve and the Lorenz curve. A Kakwani index of zero implies that the tax 
system is proportional or neutral, and the index can therefore be thought of as an index 
of “departure from proportionality” (Verbist and Figari, 2014, p.4). A positive Kakwani 
index departs from proportionality of taxation towards progressivity, and therefore 
implies a progressive tax system. A negative Kakwani index implies a regressive tax 
system. The Kakwani index varies between -2 and 1, where -2 implies serious regressivity 
and 1 implies very high progressivity (De Maio, 2007). International standard dictates 
that values between -0.1 and 0.1 indicate a neutral tax system (Inchauste et al., 2015). 
Since it is based on the Lorenz curve and the tax concentration curve, some of its 
limitations will be similar to those of the Gini coefficient, namely that it does not 
                                                          
10 The Gini index is defined as one minus twice the area under the Lorenz curve, while the 




differentiate between different types of inequality, and is more sensitive to values in the 
middle of the income distribution (De Maio, 2007).  
3.3 Results 
Evaluating the progressivity of the South African personal income tax code between 
1996 and 2017 is not entirely straightforward. Over this time period, there have been 
several counteracting changes in the personal income tax code, leading to somewhat 
ambiguous results. The top marginal tax rate decreased from 45% to 40% in the early 
2000s and stayed the same until it was increased to 41% in 2016, indicating decreased 
progressivity. However, over the same time period, the lower threshold for tax liability 
increased, which exempted many lower income earners from paying tax. This indicates 
increased personal income tax progressivity. Furthermore, the system for medical aid 
and expenditure deductions has changed significantly over this time period, and a 
system of medical aid tax credits was introduced in 2013 to increase its progressivity. 
This subchapter presents the changes in the personal income tax code between 1996 
and 2017 and their impact on tax progressivity. It will then present the changes in overall 
progressivity as measured by the pre- and post-tax Gini coefficient and the Kakwani 
index.  
 
Tax liability of representative tax payers  
To get an impression of how the personal income tax code has changed between 1996 
and 2017, it can first be useful to look at how the changes affected representative tax 
payers over this time period. In essence, we ask the question: if a person had a constant 
gross taxable income over this time period, how would that person’s net income vary? 
To illustrate this, the net incomes of earners of R1 000 000, R500 000, R250 000, and 
R100 000 between 1996 and 2017 are presented in figures 3.2-3.5 below11. For all these 
earners, net incomes were at their highest in 2013 and at their lowest in 1998 or 1999, 
meaning that 2013 was the year where they all had their lowest tax liability and 1998/99 
the years with the highest liability.  
                                                          




However, some of the earners experienced more drastic decreases in their tax liability 
between 1998/99 and 2013. Specifically, the R500 000 and R250 000 earners experienced 
increases in their net incomes by 23.2% and 21.6% between 1998 and 2013. In monetary 
terms, this means that a person earning R500 000 would have a net income of R313 776 
in 1998 and R386 502 in 2013, and that someone earning R250 000  would have a net 
income of R176 039 in 1998 and R214 052 in 2013. The R1 000 000 earner also experienced 
a significant change between 1998 and 2013. In 1998 they would have earned a net 
income of R588 776, while by 2013; the same person’s net income would have increased 
by 17.7% to R693 004. The earner who experienced the smallest difference is the R100 
000 earner – in 1998 their net income would be R87 729, while in 2013 it would be R95 417 
– a difference of only 8.8%.  
 
In terms of years of large changes, 2001 and 2003 especially stand out for the R1 000 000 
and R500 000 earners. This is because these two years saw a large decrease in the top 
marginal tax rates, first from 45% to 42% and then from 42% to 40%, to which both 
groups were subjected. For the R1 000 000 earner, their net income increased by 5.3% 
from 2000 to 2001, and a further 4.2% from 2000 to 2003. The net income of the R500 












Source: Own calculations using tax codes 1996-2017 from Budget Reviews 1995-2016 (Department of Finance, 1995-1997, 
The National Treasury of South Africa, 1998-2016). All numbers in 2015 Rands. 












Source: Own calculations using tax codes 1996-2017 from Budget Reviews 1995-2016 (Department of Finance, 1995-1997, 
The National Treasury of South Africa, 1998-2016). All numbers in 2015 Rands. 





























































Source: Own calculations using tax codes 1996-2017 from Budget Reviews 1995-2016 (Department of Finance, 1995-1997, 
The National Treasury of South Africa, 1998-2016), all numbers in 2015 Rands. 
Figure 3.4: Net income for a R250 000 earner, 1996-2017.  
 
For the R250 000 earner, the biggest change in net incomes was between 2002 and 2003, 
when their income increased by 4.6% from R188 262 to R196 910. Their net incomes 
increased further quite drastically between 2003 and 2004, from R196 910 and R204 954, 
a difference of 4.1%. Both the years 2002-2003 and 2003-2004 saw a 5% decrease in 
marginal tax rates for this income group, first from 40% to 35%, followed by a decrease 
from 35% to 30%. This income group also saw another big decrease in their marginal 
tax rate between 2006 and 2007 from 30% to 25%, but this had a smaller effect on net 



































Source: Own calculations using tax codes 1996-2017 from Budget Reviews 1995-2016 (Department of Finance, 1995-1997, 
The National Treasury of South Africa, 1998-2016), all numbers in 2015 Rands. 
Figure 3.5 Net income for a R100 000 earner, 1996-2017.  
 
The R100 000 earner saw the largest difference in net incomes between 2000 and 2001 
when the marginal tax they were subject to decreased from 30% to 26%, and between 
2003 and 2004 when their marginal tax decreased from 25% to 18%. From 2000 to 2001, 
the R100 000 earner’s net income increased by 1.6%, while it increased by 2.1% between 
2003 and 2004.  
 
All earners except the R100 000 earner saw a tax increase of 1% in their marginal taxes 
between 2015 and 2016. However, since it is such a small increase it did not have a large 
effect on the net incomes of these earners – the R1 000 000, R500 000, and R250 000 
earners only saw their net incomes decrease by 1.23%, 0.88% and 2.7%, respectively. 
From 2004, the R100 000 earner would be in the lowest tax threshold, for which the 
marginal taxes have neither increased nor decreased. Noting this, one might mistakenly 
think that there was little change in the progressivity at the bottom end of the 
distribution. However, while there was little change in progressivity for those in the 
lowest tax thresholds, the tax thresholds themselves increased over the same time 





























the case between 2003 and 2013, where the minimum threshold for tax liability increased 
from R54 142 to R74 539 – an increase of 37.7%.  
 
Drivers of progressivity change 
Three main drivers of progressivity change between 1996 and 2017 can be identified: 
decreases in top marginal tax rates, increased tax thresholds for tax liability, and 
increased progressivity in the tax treatment of medical aid contributions and medical 
expenses. Figure 3.6 below illustrates marginal tax rates and tax thresholds in years of 
reform; 1996, 2001, 2003, and 2016. The first thing to notice is that the slope of the 
marginal tax schedule decreased between 1996 and 2016, meaning that a larger increase 
in one’s income was required to move into a higher tax bracket. The second change is 
that the top marginal tax rate decreased from 45% in 1996 to 42% in 2001 and 40% in 
2003, and then only increased again to 41% in 2016.  
Source: Budget Reviews 1995 (Department of Finance, 1995), 2001, 2003 and 2016 (The National Treasury of South Africa, 
2001, 2003, 2016) 
Figure 3.6 Marginal tax rates on income in 1996, 2001, 2003, and 2016 
  
One can further see that there were more tax brackets in the 1996 tax code than there 
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tax rates, while from 1999 onwards there were only six. The marginal tax rates for the 
four top brackets in 1996 were higher than for the top income brackets in 2001, 2003, 
and 2016.  These reductions in the top marginal tax rates and decrease in the tax liability 
of higher income earners indicates a reduction in tax progressivity. 
 
As previously mentioned, the lower threshold for tax liability changed significantly 
between tax years 1996 and 2017, even when the thresholds are adjusted for inflation. In 
1996, only earners with a taxable income above R46 321 in 2015 Rands were liable to pay 
tax, while in 2013 this threshold had increased to R74 126 – a difference of almost 
R30 000. This means that many people at the lower end of the earnings distribution who 
would have been liable to pay tax in 1996 would not have been so in 2013. Since this 
change of paying less tax due to threshold increases affected only lower income earners, 
it indicates an increase in overall tax progressivity. However, it should be kept in mind 
that these threshold changes have not impacted those at the very bottom of the income 
distribution, as anyone with yearly taxable incomes below R46 321 would not have been 
liable to pay tax over this time period at all. Interestingly, the increase in tax thresholds 
happened over the same period as the reduction in top marginal tax rates, indicating 
that tax relief took place both at the top and bottom end of the income distribution. 
 
From my own calculations, the average income tax rates have steadily declined since 
the late 1990s. This makes intuitive sense considering that fewer people are liable to pay 
tax (and thus face a tax rate of zero) combined with lower marginal tax rates at the top 
end of the income distribution. While the average tax rate for all individuals with 
income data in the sample was 26.5% in 1997, it was 12.5% in 2015. Important to keep in 
mind is that since these average rates are calculated by applying tax codes to the Wave 
4 of the NIDS dataset, they do not reflect the average rates of the populations in other 





Another key factor which impacted the progressivity of the personal income tax code in 
South Africa was the change in the tax treatment of medical aid contributions and 
medical expenditures, both of which have qualified for significant deductions and 
rebates. As shown in table 3.1 below, which summarises the tax treatment of medical aid 
contributions and medical expenditure between 1996 and 2017, three main policies have 
been in place. From 1996 to 2006, all medical expenditure above a specified threshold 
was deductible. Then, from 2007 to 2012, the monthly deductions for medical scheme 
contributions were capped to enhance the equity of the deduction system. Additional 
expenditure above a set threshold was still deductible. From 2013 onward, the medical 
scheme deductions were replaced by a fixed monthly tax credit for medical aid 
contributions, with partial deductions for additional expenditure above a threshold. In 
addition to incentivising medical aid scheme uptake, one of the main motivations 
behind the conversion to tax credits was to further increase progressivity of the tax 
treatment of medical aid contributions. This change would avoid rewarding those who 




Table 3.1 Tax treatment of medical aid contributions and medical expenses, 1996-2017 
 1996-2003 2003-2006 2007-2012 
Under 65 Medical expenditure 
exceeding the greater of 
5% of taxable income or 
R1000 is deductible 
Medical 
expenditure 
exceeding 5% of 
taxable income is 
deductible 
Medical scheme contributions up to a set 
amount (R824-893 for self + first 
dependant and R445-553 for additional 
dependants) are deductible. Additional 
expenditure on medical expenses schemes 
and other medical expenditure as exceed 
7.5% of taxable income are deductible. 
Over 65 All qualifying medical 





All qualifying medical expenditure is 
deductible. 
Disabled Medical expenditure 




exceeding R500 is 
deductible. 
All qualifying medical expenditure is 
deductible.  
 
Source: South African Revenue Service (2004-2016)  
 2013-2014 2015-2017 
Under 65 Medical aid tax credits (R268-270 for self + 
first dependant, R180-181 for additional 
dependants). Balance of contributions 
exceeding 4 times the tax credit are 
deductible, as are qualifying out-of-pocket 
medical expenses exceeding 7.5% of taxable 
income.  
Medical aid tax credits (R269-R272 for self + 
first dependant, R180-182 for additional 
dependants). Balance of contributions 
exceeding 4 times the tax credit are deductible, 
as are qualifying out-of-pocket medical 
expenses exceeding 7.5% of taxable income. 
Over 65 All qualifying medical expenditure is 
deductible. 
Medical aid tax credits (R269-272 for self + first 
dependant, R180-182 for additional 
dependants). 33.3% of medical scheme 
contributions as exceed 3 times the tax credit, 
as well as 33.3% of all medical expenditure are 
tax deductible. 
Disabled Medical aid tax credits (R268-270 for self 
and first dependant and R180-181 for 
additional dependants). Balance of 
contributions exceeding 4 times the tax 
credit is deductible, as are all qualifying out-
of-pocket medical expenses. 
Medical aid tax credits (R269-272 for self + first 
dependant, R180-182 for additional 
dependants). 33.3% of medical scheme 
contributions as exceed 3 times the tax credit, 




Measures of overall progressivity 
As previously noted, changes in the personal income tax code between 1996 and 2017 
have pulled in different directions. This is reflected in the progressivity statistics. Firstly, 
we can see from table 3.2 that the pre-tax Gini coefficient of per capita taxable income 
in NIDS Wave 4 is 0.8006. The tax years with the lowest post-tax Gini coefficients are 
1997 and 1999, where they take the value of 0.7543. In later years, the personal income 
tax code appears to have become less inequality-reducing, with the post-tax Gini 
coefficient rising steadily to 0.7727 in 2015. Looking at these pre- and post-tax Gini 
coefficients one could conclude that the tax code has become less progressive over time. 
However, if one considers the Kakwani measure of tax progressivity, the progressivity 
of personal income tax has risen steadily since the late 1990s. For 1997, the Kakwani 
index takes a value of 0.1311, whereas it is 0.1982 for 2017.  
 Table 3.2 Progressivity measures of the personal income tax code, 1996-2017 
Source: Own calculations using NIDS Wave 4 (2016) with Wave 4 survey weights and tax codes from Budget Reviews 1996-
2017 
 
  Tax year         
Measures 2017 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 
Pre-tax Gini 0.8006 0.8006 0.8006 0.8006 0.8006 0.8006 0.8006 0.8006 
Post-tax Gini 0.771 0.7717 0.7727 0.7673 0.7678 0.7677 0.7673 0.7676 
Average tax rate 0.1305 0.1299 0.1253 0.1638 0.1616 0.1795 0.1731 0.1802 
Kakwani index 0.1982 0.1948 0.1956 0.1708 0.1711 0.1521 0.1597 0.152 
  
        
 
2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 
Pre-tax Gini 0.8006 0.8006 0.8006 0.8006 0.8006 0.8006 0.8006 0.8006 
Post-tax Gini 0.7674 0.7677 0.7673 0.766 0.7653 0.765 0.7636 0.7599 
Average tax rate 0.1854 0.1823 0.1842 0.1952 0.2003 0.2043 0.2165 0.2351 
Kakwani index 0.1475 0.1494 0.1493 0.1447 0.1429 0.1406 0.1362 0.1347 
  
        
 
2001 2000 1999 1998 1997 1996 
  
Pre-tax Gini 0.8006 0.8006 0.8006 0.8006 0.8006 0.8006 
  
Post-tax Gini 0.759 0.7547 0.7543 0.7543 0.7543 0.7556 
  
Average tax rate 0.2421 0.2611 0.2634 0.2640 0.2652 0.2203 
  




As mentioned in chapter 3.2, the Kakwani index can be interpreted as a departure from 
proportionality, and proportionality would be indicated by Kakwani values between -
0.1 and 0.1. Considering this, some of the Kakwani values given in table 3.2 are not far 
from proportionality. Remembering that the Kakwani index directly measures 
progressivity as the relative concentration of taxes compared to the concentration of 
incomes explains why the values are so low for South Africa - the income distribution is 
simply so unequal that the tax concentration would have to be much greater to get 
higher Kakwani values. 
 
It may seem contradictory that the two progressivity statistics in this chapter point in 
opposite directions. In order to make sense of this result, we should note that while 
both are indicators of progressivity, they measure different dimensions of it. The pre- 
and post-tax Gini coefficients measure the inequality-reducing effect of personal 
income tax, while the Kakwani index measures the concentration of incomes relative to 
the concentration of pre-tax incomes. Given that we know that tax thresholds have 
increased and that the “average tax rate” has decreased over this time period, it makes 
intuitive sense that those who are paying tax have become fewer and that their tax 
burden has become more concentrated and hence, that the Kakwani index has 
increased. However, the inequality-reducing effect of taxation also depends on how high 
the top marginal tax rates are and how many people are paying taxes. Therefore, since 
we know that the top marginal tax rates decreased in the early 2000s, it makes sense 
that the post-tax Gini coefficient has increased over this time period. In conclusion, 
evaluating whether progressivity increased or decreased between 1996 and 2017 is not 
straightforward - if we consider the Kakwani index it has increased, but if we solely look 






Chapter 4  
A negative income tax for South Africa 
South Africa’s social grants are mainly targeted towards the elderly, disabled, and 
children, leaving a large fraction of those vulnerable to and living in poverty without 
any social assistance. A negative income tax could change this. A negative income tax 
provides an income transfer to individuals with incomes below a certain threshold, 
which decreases with income and equals zero when it reaches the threshold 
(Zeckhauser, 1971; Ashenfelter and Plant, 1990). The size of the transfer is directly 
related to the recipient’s income, so it specifically targets the poor. Since the only 
eligibility criterion for the negative income tax  is to have an income below a certain 
threshold, it can benefit the large number of unemployed and working poor who fall 
between two chairs in the current transfer system.12 This chapter explores the possibility 
of implementing a negative income tax in South Africa. Chapter 4.1 explains the basic 
characteristics of a negative income tax, while chapter 4.2 discusses the empirical 
literature on negative income taxes. Chapter 4.3 explains the methodology used to 
simulate a negative income tax policy for South Africa, and chapter 4.4 discusses the 
results. 
 
4.1 Basic characteristics 
Ashenfelter and Plant (1990) describe the basic set-up of a negative income tax as 
follows: if the recipient has no income, they will receive a guaranteed subsidy G. The 
subsidy D given to recipients with a positive income Y, is a decreasing function of 
income, decreasing at rate τ. As such, the income subsidy will be given by equations 4.1 
and 4.2.  
                                                          
12In 2016, the unemployment rate ranged between 26.5% and 27.1% (Statistics South Africa, 
2017b). Woolard and Klasen (2009) highlight that despite the high unemployment rate, 
unemployment insurance in South Africa is virtually nonexistent. Finn (2015) estimates that 5 
448 263 people in South Africa can be considered “working poor”. 
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𝐷 = 𝐺 − τY if Y <
G
τ
    (4.1) 
𝐷 = 0 𝑖𝑓 𝑌 >
𝐺
τ
    (4.2) 
The quantity 𝐵 =
𝐺
𝜏
  is the “breakeven” quantity, and is the quantity at which the subsidy 
received is zero. If income equals the wage rate times the hours worked, the implicit 
wage rate for a low-income worker will be 𝑌 = 𝑤(1 − 𝜏), since the subsidy will decrease 
by 𝑤𝜏 for each hour worked. τ can therefore be referred to as the implicit tax rate or the 
take-back rate13.  
 
The negative income tax is administered through the tax system rather than by a 
separate social security unit. It functions almost exactly like the personal income tax 
except that instead of paying a net tax, individuals receive a net subsidy – hence its 
name. The only requirement for receiving the income subsidy is having an income 
below a certain threshold. Its conceptual and administrative simplicity makes it 
accessible and saves administrative costs. Furthermore, utilising the infrastructure of 
the already well-functioning South African tax system ensures reliability and 
accountability, and brings lower-income earners into the tax system. This is beneficial 
in terms of collecting tax data on lower income earners.  
 
A negative income tax is similar to other income transfer programmes, such as the basic 
income grant and the earned income tax credit. The main difference between a negative 
income tax  and a basic income grant is that while the basic income grant gives a set 
transfer to everyone, the negative income tax  only gives an income subsidy to those 
below a set threshold, and it decreases with income (Tondani, 2009). If progressive 
taxation is used to finance a basic income grant, net transfers could be the same as with 
a negative income tax. This would make the two policies identical in practice14, with 
individuals below the threshold getting a net transfer and individuals above getting a 
                                                          
13 It can also be referred to as a marginal tax rate, but to avoid confusion with marginal taxes in 
other parts of the paper, I refrain from using that terminology. 




net tax. The basic income grant has received much attention in South Africa, both in 
policy circles and academic literature. Notably, the 2002 report by the Taylor Committee 
of Inquiry into a Comprehensive Social Security System for South Africa (based on a 
commissioned report by Economic Policy Research Unit (Samson et al., 2002)) 
recommended the phasing in of a modest basic income grant (Barchiesi, 2007). While 
this policy suggestion was supported by many civil society organisations, including a 
BIG Coalition consisting of – among others – COSATU, various Christian organisations 
and Black Sash, it was not supported by the Treasury (Makino, 2003). Following this, 
there have been some contributions to the academic debate by for instance Standing 
and Samson (2003) and Seekings (2005), but the debate on a South African basic income 
grant has seemed to mostly die down. The earned income tax credit works similarly to 
a negative income tax, but includes a work requirement for the recipient (Rothstein, 
2010), meaning that non-workers do not receive any transfer. If there is full 
employment, the earned income tax credit is identical to the negative income tax.  
 
The two main parameters to be determined in a negative income tax are the guaranteed 
subsidy G and the implicit tax rate τ (Widerquist, 2005). If G is set too low, the negative 
income tax’s ability to alleviate poverty diminishes, but if it is set too high work 
disincentive effects will be too large and the programme becomes fiscally unaffordable. 
A high τ lowers the programme costs, but increases work disincentives. One risks 
creating a poverty trap where individuals do not increase their work hours to avoid 
losing their income subsidy. A low τ increases work incentives, and policymakers 
concerned about this will therefore typically set τ at less than 100% (Tobin et al., 1967; 
Zeckhauser, 1971).15  However, a low τ also increases the programme costs, and privileges 
the “less poor” over the poorest. The negative income tax’s ability to reduce poverty 
therefore depends on its design and the size of its key parameters. For instance, it can 
be designed to eliminate headcount poverty for recipients by setting the guaranteed 
subsidy equal to the poverty line. 
                                                          
15This is to avoid a situation where a recipient will be unwilling to work an hour more because 
that hour will be “taxed away” anyway, leaving the same result as if they were to not work that 




The negative income tax can have a significant redistributive impact. This is supported 
by evidence from Abul Naga, Kolodziejczyk, and Mueller (2008), which shows that a 
negative income tax  designed to eliminate poverty also reduces inequality more 
dramatically than other income maintenance schemes. Angyridis and Thompson (2015) 
similarly find that increasing the guaranteed subsidy both reduces relative and absolute 
poverty, and causes significant redistribution. They note, however, that in their study 
the results come “at the expense of a significant reduction of output” (Angyridis and 
Thompson, 2015, p.1). This is because tax rates must be very high to finance the negative 
income tax, which has distortive labour supply effects. This legitimises a concern raised 
by Golladay and Haveman (1976), who found that the negative output effects offsets the 
negative income tax’s redistributional impact.  
 
A simple income criterion may make the threshold lower for seeking assistance 
(Diamond, 1968), as it will not depend on previous work experience or any other criteria 
which could exclude the most needy16. However, it may lead people to decrease or 
manipulate their earnings to become eligible (Ashenfelter and Plant, 1990; Cox, 1998). 
It is unclear how large a risk this poses. In Joulfaian and Rider's (1996) survey of U.S. tax 
returns in 1988, they found underreporting income in the earned income tax credit to 
be modest. 
 
Similarly, a frequently raised concern about the negative income tax is that it reduces 
labour supply. If both income and leisure are normal goods, classical theory dictates 
that with a negative income tax, individuals will decrease their work hours as leisure 
becomes relatively cheaper, absent any preference changes (Green, 1968, p.280). 
Gallaway (1966) argues that the labour supply response would be large enough to negate 
the positive effects of the negative income tax, and is therefore sceptical of its potential 
                                                          
16Unemployment insurance, for instance, is a short-term measure which requires previous 
w0rk – clearly problematic in a country where many of the employed have no work experience 
or have been unemployed for a long period of time (Banerjee et al., 2008).  
39 
 
for reducing poverty, except for groups with already low levels of labour force 
participation. Diamond (1968) notes that there may also be disincentive effects for those 
above the poverty level, and that the negative income tax may in the long run affect 
saving patterns. The disincentive effects do not only have welfare implications, but also 
affect the size of the transfer which can be financed (Diamond, 1968). If people reduce 
work hours to qualify for the income subsidy, the number of eligible recipients would 
be larger. 
 
Killingsworth (1976) challenges the classical theory by considering family labour supply 
models rather than individual labour supply models. In these models, the effect of the 
negative income tax on labour supply is indeterminate, and in certain cases positive. 
Notably, if a couple has an interdependent utility function where one person’s utility 
not only depends on their own leisure and income but also on their partner’s leisure, a 
negative income tax can increase labour supply. Killingsworth’s results come with the 
limitation of only pertaining to couples who can adjust their labour supply on the 
intensive margin. However, if there are constraints to labour market participation17, one 
can imagine a model where this holds for the extensive margin too. Similarly, Saez 
(2002) finds that the negative income tax  is the optimal transfer programme if labour 
supply effects are concentrated on the intensive margin, but that a programme more 
similar to the earned income tax credit is optimal if they are concentrated on the 
extensive margin. Ultimately, the question of labour supply effects is an empirical one, 
and it is returned to in the following section on empirical research of the negative 
income tax. 
 
4.2 Empirical research on the negative income tax 
The empirical research on the negative income tax can be divided into two strands: the 
experimental literature, mostly focused on the negative income tax experiments in the 
United States, and the microsimulation literature, which has gained most traction in 
                                                          
17 For instance, high job-seeking costs  
40 
 
European countries. There is little empirical literature with a developing country as the 
subject, save for one micro-macro simulation model for South Africa.  
 
Experimental literature 
The experimental literature on the negative income tax comes mainly from four US 
experiments that took place between 1968 and 1980 and one Canadian experiment from 
around the same time18 (Widerquist, 2005). These experiments varied in sample size, 
recipient criteria and location (Robins, 1985; Widerquist, 2005). They also varied in the 
size of the guaranteed subsidy and the implicit tax rate. In the US experiments, the 
income guarantee varied between 50% and 148% of the poverty level, and the guarantees 
in the Canadian experiment were also near the poverty level at the time (Widerquist, 
2005). A key motivation for the experiments was to empirically estimate their effect on 
the labour supply. While interpretations of the results from the experiments differ, most 
of the literature agrees that there was a non-negligible labour supply decrease. However, 
the experiments showed no evidence of large withdrawals from the labour force 
(Robins, 1985; Widerquist, 2005). Furthermore, there was no evidence that the work-
effort response was large enough to threaten the fiscal viability of the negative income 
tax (Widerquist, 2005). The decrease in labour supply differed across gender and marital 
status – wives, single female heads, and youth reduced their labour supply significantly 
more than husbands (Robins, 1985). The magnitude of work effort reduction found in 
the five experiments ranged from 0.5% to 9% for husbands, 0% to 27% for wives, and 
15% to 30% for single female heads. The labour supply for youth followed a similar 
pattern as wives and single female heads. Burtless and Hausman (1978) found that the 
negative income tax had a very small effect on the labour supply for a large part of the 
population, but that for a minority, the labour supply effect was substantial. The relative 
importance of income and substitution effects was contentious. While Burtless and 
Hausman (1978) found that the income effect played a far larger role than the 
                                                          
18The US experiments were the New Jersey Graduated Work Experiment (1968-1972), the Rural 
Income Maintenance Experiment (1970-1972), the Seattle/Denver Income Maintenance 
Experiment (1970-1980), and the Gary Income Maintenance Experiment (1971-1974). The 
Canadian experiment was the Manitoba Basic Annual Income Experiment (1975-1978). 
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substitution effect in determining the labour supply response, Robins (1985) found that 
the relative importance varied across gender and marital status, with substitution 
effects being the most important for wives, while income effects dominated for single 
female heads. The interpretation of racial differences in labour supply responses was 
also controversial. While Robins (1985) reported that black and Latino/Mexican 
participants had a larger labour supply response than white participants,  Moffitt (1981, 
p. 25) stated that interracial differences “appear[ed] to be only a result of random 
statistical error”.  
 
There are several concerns regarding the validity of the results from the negative income 
tax experiments. One limitation results from the well-intended attempt to experiment 
with different values of the guaranteed subsidy and the implicit tax rate, making the 
numbers of participants in each treatment group relatively small (Ashenfelter and Plant, 
1990). The small sample size was an issue for most of the experiments. The 
Seattle/Denver Income Maintenance Experiment had a much larger sample size than 
the other experiments, however, so its estimates are more precise (Robins, 1985). A 
second issue was that assignment to treatment groups was not random. Families with 
higher market incomes were more likely to receive more generous programmes 
(Widerquist, 2005; Ashenfelter and Plant, 1990), which may have introduced bias into 
the estimates. Further, attrition appeared to be closely related to the type of programme 
a family was assigned to (Ashenfelter and Plant, 1990). Other concerns were that the 
experiments took place only over the relative short term, that there was underreporting 
of incomes, and Hawthorne effects (Widerquist, 2005).  
Microsimulation literature 
There is also a substantial negative income tax literature which uses microsimulation 
models. While the negative income tax experiments took place in North America 
between 1968 and 1980, the microsimulation literature is more recent, and mostly 
focused on European countries. Simulations have been used to study the effect of a 
negative income tax for Denmark  (Colombino et al., 2008), Finland (Honkanen, 2014), 
Italy (Aaberge, Colombino and Strøm, 2004; Narazani and Shima, 2008; Colombino et 
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al., 2008), Portugal (Colombino et al., 2008), South Africa (Magnani and Badaoui, 2015), 
Switzerland (Abul Naga, Kolodziejczyk and Mueller, 2008), and the UK (Colombino et 
al. 2008). Most of the studies use microsimulation models, but Magnani and Badaoui 
(2015) use a micro-macro simulation model.  
 
Aaberge, Colombino and Strøm (2004) use a behavioural microsimulation model to 
compare a negative income tax complemented with a flat tax to a workfare scheme and 
a flat tax scenario in Italy. Characteristics of the model include partners’ simultaneous 
choices and constraints on choice of work hours, which the authors deem essential for 
the results. They find no evidence that a negative income tax creates participation 
disincentives or a poverty trap for the lowest two deciles. Further, they find that the 
negative income tax and workfare models are more equalising than a flat tax – the only 
decile that loses is the top decile. Lastly, the simulations show that labour supply wage 
elasticities are inversely related to income, suggesting that lower marginal tax rates will 
be more efficient for low income earners than high income earners. Narazani and Shima 
(2008) also simulate a negative income tax for Italy, and compares it to two similar 
programmes, a basic income grant and a workfare tax. The paper combines a static 
microsimulation model of EUROMOD and a labour supply model. As in Aaberge, 
Colombino and Strøm (2004) the negative income tax is complemented by a flat tax. 
They find that on the intensive margin, the labour supply changes from a negative 
income tax are small, and larger in the Southern than Northern Italy. The work 
disincentives are increasing in benefit level. They are larger (for males) at the lowest 
deciles, and decreases with income. On the extensive margin, the authors distinguish 
between full and part-time participation. For full-time participation, the extensive 
margin results follow the intensive margin results. However, for part-time participation, 
male labour supply is neutral to transfer size, while female labour supply decreases with 
size. Unsurprisingly, the more generous the scheme, the larger effect it has on reducing 
inequality. A negative income tax where the guaranteed subsidy is 75% of the poverty 
line decreases the Gini coefficient from 0.25 to 0.16 in Central and Southern Italy, and 
from 0.22 to 0.18 in Northern Italy, whereas a guaranteed subsidy of 57% of the poverty 




Colombino et al. (2008) use EUROMOD to simulate the effects of a negative income tax 
for Denmark, Italy, Portugal, and the United Kingdom. It includes a negative income 
tax financed by a flat tax and a negative income tax financed by a progressive tax. 
Similarly to  Aaberge, Colombino and Strøm (2004), they find that members of 
households with higher incomes have a less elastic labour supply, and therefore suggest 
that financing a negative income tax  through a progressive tax better exploits these 
elasticities. Colombino et al. (2008) also find that in countries with low female 
participation rates, a negative income tax is more affordable than alternative guaranteed 
income schemes. Abul Naga, Kolodziejczyk and Mueller (2008) compare a variety of 
potential income maintenance schemes in Switzerland using microsimulation, 
including a full and a partial negative income tax19. The microsimulation model includes 
a tax-benefit model and a model of labour supply. The full negative income tax is 
designed to eliminate poverty with a guaranteed subsidy equal to subsistence 
expenditure, while the guaranteed subsidy of the partial negative income tax is 50% of 
subsistence expenditure. They find that the full negative income tax reduces income 
inequality most drastically of the maintenance schemes, reducing the Gini coefficient 
from 0.21 to 0.14. As it eliminates headcount poverty by design, the poverty headcount 
decreases from 3.3% to 0%. The partial negative income tax is less effective in reducing 
poverty and inequality, but is also less expensive to implement than the full negative 
income tax, which would require a linear tax rate of 62% to be viable. By contrast, the 
partial negative income tax would require a linear tax rate of 51%. It reduces the Gini 
coefficient to 0.162, and the poverty headcount to 1.1%. Honkanen (2014) compares a 
negative income tax to a basic income grant using SISU, a static microsimulation model 
for Finland. The paper finds that redistribution is more efficient if using a negative 
income tax than a basic income grant, but that the two policies are otherwise quite 
similar, as both can significantly reduce poverty and inequality. Compared to the 
current (2010) system, the negative income tax reduces the Gini coefficient from 0.27 to 
                                                          
19The other maintenance schemes assessed are a participation income covering 50% of 
subsistence cost of living, income support which tops up household resources to the level of 
subsistence expenditure, and a simplified form of the earned income tax credit.  
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0.23. The poverty rate – defined as under 50% of median income – decreases from 6.9% 
to 2.9% with the negative income tax.  
 
Magnani and Badaoui (2015) appears to be the only study assessing a negative income 
tax for South Africa, and they use a micro-macro simulation model. Their proposed 
policy is a combination of a flat tax rate of 20% and a lump-sum transfer of R408 to 
everyone. While non-workers and informal sector workers receive the full transfer, 
workers in the formal sector only receive a net transfer if “their income is lower than 
the transfer divided by the flat rate” (Magnani and Badaoui 2015, p.20). An interesting 
addition is that informal sector workers are explicitly included and that their net 
transfer equals that of non-workers, regardless of income20. Since all recipients receive 
the same amount, calling the proposed policy a negative income tax is a bit of a 
misnomer, as it more closely resembles a basic income grant. However, the study is 
included because of the lack of similar studies for a South African (and developing 
country) context. It finds that the policy reduces poverty and inequality through 
reducing the level of unemployment. The poverty rate in the sample decreases from 
34.4% to 32.6%, and the Gini coefficient decreases from 0.60 to 0.59. However, it also 
discourages labour market and formal sector participation while increasing the size of 
the informal sector.   
4.3 Methodology 
Chapter 4.4 simulates two negative income tax proposals, whose set-up is as follows: 
each individual between 18 and 59 years of age whose taxable income is less than R1309 
(R670) per month, will receive a subsidy which equals R1309 (R670) minus their taxable 
income. This means that the implicit tax rate τ = 1, and the income subsidy D received 
will be given by equations 4.3 and 4.4. 
                                                          
20The basic income and negative income tax literature typically does not explicitly include the 
informal sector. This may not be of large significance in a developed country with a small 
informal sector, but in a country with a large informal sector it may introduce fairness 




𝐷 = 𝐺 − Y if Y < G    (4.3) 
𝐷 = 0 𝑖𝑓 𝑌 > 𝐺    (4.4) 
If they have a taxable income of zero, they will receive the guaranteed subsidy of R1309 
(R670) per month. Individuals with taxable incomes above R1309 (R670) will not receive 
any subsidy. The taxable income which determines eligibility is the same gross taxable 
income variable 𝑔 discussed in chapter 1.2. The extra income from the negative income 
tax is added back to household income, from which poverty and inequality measures 
are calculated. The total costs of the potential negative income tax policies are 
calculated by scaling the total negative income tax subsidies up to the country level 
using survey weights.  
Deciding on the size of the basic grant of the negative income tax 
In this paper, the main proposed negative income tax has a guaranteed subsidy of R1309 
per month, which is the upper-bound poverty line proposed in Budlender, Leibbrandt, 
and Woolard (2015) inflated to 2015 Rands. This is referred to as the upper-bound 
negative income tax from here on out. Additionally, a negative income tax policy which 
sets the guaranteed subsidy at the lower-bound poverty line of R670 per month is 
simulated (referred to as the lower-bound negative income tax). Pegging the negative 
income tax to a poverty line is standard practice in both the experimental and 
simulation literature. The American negative income tax experiments all set their 
guaranteed subsidies equal to between 50% and 150% of the poverty line, and the 
guaranteed subsidy in the Canadian experiment was a monetary amount close to the 
poverty line at the time (Widerquist, 2005). Similarly, several negative income tax  
microsimulations peg the guaranteed subsidy to a poverty line or similar measures - 
Abul Naga, Kolodziejczyk and Mueller (2008) simulate two grants which cover 50% and 
100% of “subsistence expenditures”, respectively, while Narazani and Shima (2008) 
simulate subsidies that vary between 25% and 100% of the poverty line. Others choose 
sizes which relate to other notions of what a basic income is or are of comparable size 
to other social transfers. De Jager, Graafland, and Gelauff (1996) set the guaranteed 
subsidy at 50% of the minimum wage, and Honkanen (2014) sets the subsidy at a level 
close to the Finnish basic unemployment allowance and guaranteed pension. The only 
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South African microsimulation of a policy similar to a negative income tax sets the 
transfer at R408 per month, which is similar in size to the food poverty line in 
Budlender, Leibbrandt and Woolard (2015) inflated to 2015 Rands, R421.  
The main proposal uses the upper-bound poverty line constructed by Budlender, 
Leibbrandt and Woolard (2015) because it exists as a meaningful measure of poverty, 
and is easily interpreted, while also having transparent theoretical underpinnings. As 
Budlender, Leibbrandt and Woolard (2015) note, this upper-bound poverty line can be 
interpreted as the minimum level of expenditure required to cover basic food and non-
food needs. They do not encourage use of the lower-bound poverty line as it lacks any 
intuitive interpretation as a measure of economic well-being. However, the second 
proposal is pegged to the lower-bound poverty line to illustrate the effects of a less costly 
negative income tax. While a monthly income of R1309 or R670 does not make one well 
off by any standard, it ensures a degree of income stability that can have a significant 
impact on a poor household. 
 
Eligibility for receiving the negative income tax 
Part of the appeal of the negative income tax is that its only criteria for eligibility is 
income. However, the negative income tax in this paper has a couple of additional 
criteria. Since the negative income tax is administered through the personal income tax 
system, the unit of taxation for the negative income tax is the individual. Hence, 
eligibility for and the size of the income subsidy received depend on one’s individual 
rather than household income. This has some obvious drawbacks, including that some 
low- or no-income earners will share households with high income earners, and as such, 
may not actually be part of the intended recipient group. This issue could potentially be 
mitigated by having an upper limit on total household income, as is the case with the 
old-age pension. However, given that much of the appeal of the negative income tax is 
its simplicity as well as its symmetry with the personal income tax system, this negative 
income tax bases eligibility on individual income only. 
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Furthermore, the decision has been made to administer the negative income tax only to 
individuals over 18 and below age 60. This is because both the younger and older groups 
are already covered by social grants in South Africa - the child support grant and the old 
age pension, respectively. While the child support grant only gives R350 per month to 
recipients, the maximum amount of the old age pension is currently set at R1500  per 
month and is thus of a similar magnitude as the proposed negative income tax. 
4.4 Results 
This subchapter discusses the results of the negative income tax microsimulations. 
These results include the size and coverage of the two negative income tax policies, the 
demographics of the eligible negative income tax recipients, and the impact the two 
policies have on income inequality and poverty. 
Size and coverage 
By necessity, implementing a negative income tax in the South African context will be 
a large-scale project. Considering the proportion of the population living in poverty, any 
social grant or subsidy which targets the poor is costly. This is especially the case for the 
upper-bound negative income tax. Using the eligibility criteria outlined in chapter 4.3, 
14.5 million individuals are eligible to receive an income subsidy through the upper-
bound negative income tax. The average subsidy for a negative income tax recipient is 
R1 142, and 11.1 million people - or 76.8% of the eligible recipients - will receive the 
guaranteed subsidy of R1 309 per month. Assuming full uptake of the programme, the 
total cost for the upper-bound negative income tax programme is R16.5 billion per 
month, or R198.6 billion per year. In comparison, the combined cost of the child support 
grant, old age pension, and disability grant was R140.5 billion in 2016 (The National 
Treasury of South Africa, 2016). This means that in order to implement such a policy, 
the government would have to more than double their expenditure on social grants.  
The lower-bound negative income tax differs in size, but is in all other respects identical 
to the upper-bound negative income tax. It is also significantly less expensive. This is 
mainly because the amount that eligible recipients receive is smaller. The number of 
eligible recipients also decreases, but not by a very large amount. This is because many 
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of the eligible recipients are zero-income earners who in either policy scenario will 
receive the guaranteed subsidy. In the lower-bound negative income tax policy, 12.7 
million individuals are eligible to receive and income subsidy. Of these, 11.1 million 
individuals (or 87.4% of eligible recipients) receive the full amount of R670 per month. 
The total cost for this programme totals at R7.9 billion per month, or R94.7 billion per 
year. Hence, the cost of the lower-bound negative income tax is less than half of the 
amount of the upper-bound negative income tax. To illustrate how these programmes 
compare to each other as well as the existing social grants, figure 4.1 below shows their 
costs. As is seen, due to their size, the negative income tax programmes are relatively 
expensive. While the financing of these programmes is not discussed in detail in this 
chapter, chapter 5 looks at the potential for increasing tax revenue through increased 
taxes at the top end of the income distribution. Chapter 6 discusses the negative income 
tax in light of this, and simulates a combined proposal of a negative income tax paid for 
by increased marginal tax rates for top income earners. 
Source: 2016 Budget Review and own calculations using NIDS Wave 4 with Wave 4 survey weights. 
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Who are the recipients? 
The main reason a negative income tax is particularly suitable for South Africa is its 
ability to target parts of the population that do not have access to the existing social 
security system of grants, pensions and unemployment insurance. The design of the 
negative income tax proposals ensures that only individuals between 18 and 59 years 
with gross incomes less than R1309 and R670 are eligible to receive an income subsidy. 
Yet it is interesting to note the demographics of eligible recipients to see who is targeted 
by a negative income tax like this. What follows is a discussion of the characteristics of 
eligible recipients of the upper-bound negative income tax, and then see how they 
change with the lower-bound negative income tax.  
Firstly, the upper-bound negative income tax reaches a fairly young subset of the 
population: 45.6% of eligible recipients are between 18 and 29 years old, and an 
additional 22.7% are between 30 and 39 years old. Considering that unemployment rates 
are particularly high for younger groups compared to the population as a whole, it 
should be seen as advantageous that the negative income tax is successful in targeting 
this subset of the population. In 2016, unemployment rates for individuals age 15-24 and 
25-34 ranged between 50.9-54.5% and 31.2-32.1%, respectively, while unemployment 
rates for the population as a whole ranged between 26.5% and 27.1% (Statistics South 
Africa 2017b). Further, it can be noted that the vast majority of individuals eligible to 
receive the negative income tax are African. The proportion of eligible negative income 
tax recipients who are African is 85.6%, meaning that this population group makes up 
more than their population share of 80.4%. 8.2% and 2% of eligible negative income tax 
recipients are Coloured and Indian/Asian, meaning that these groups make up close to 
their population shares of 8.8% and 2.5%, respectively. Only 4.2% of eligible negative 
income tax recipients are White, meaning that White individuals only make up roughly 
half of their population share (8.3%). Another important feature of the individuals 
eligible for the negative income tax is that they are much less likely to be employed than 
the rest of the population. Only 22.2% of eligible negative income tax recipients are 
employed, while the proportion is 46.5% for the population as a whole. Of individuals 
eligible for the upper-bound negative income tax, 49.1% are not economically active and 
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28.6% are unemployed (of which 2.5% are discouraged workers and 26.1% are 
unemployed in the “strict” definition).  
The majority of eligible negative income tax recipients are women. While women make 
up only 51.3% of the population, 61.6% of eligible negative income tax recipients are 
female. This raises the potential concern that many recipients with low incomes do not 
actually live in low-income households. While this concern is not entirely unfounded, 
it is also not as gendered as one might expect. While 31.2% of female negative income 
tax recipients belong to households with per capita incomes above R1309 per month, so 
do 34.2% of male negative income tax recipients. Combined with the feature that the 
mean household income for negative income tax recipients belonging to households 
with per capita incomes above R1309 per month is R3780, this suggests that it is not a 
large concern. 
 
Figure 4.2 Age group    Figure 4.3 Population group 


















Figures 4.2-4.6: Demographic characteristics of individuals eligible to receive the upper-bound 
negative income tax. Source: Own calculations using NIDS Wave 4 with Wave 4 survey weights 
Lastly, figure 4.6 shows that the majority (57.3%) of eligible recipients stays in urban 
areas. However, urban recipients make up slightly less than their population share of 
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of 34%, with 39.2% of eligible negative income tax recipients staying traditional areas. 
Individuals living on farms make up 3.6% of eligible recipients, roughly the same as their 
population share of 4%.  
The demographic factors of prospective negative income tax recipients do not appear 
to change significantly with the lower-bound negative income tax, except in the case of 
employment status. Only 11.8% of eligible recipients for the lower-bound negative 
income tax are employed, a 10.8 percentage point difference from the upper-bound 
negative income tax. 55.8% of eligible recipients are not economically active and 32.3% 
are unemployed (of which 2.8% are discouraged workers and 11.8% are unemployed in 
the “strict definition”). Much of the lack of change in the other characteristics can likely 
be attributed to the large number of zero-earners who are the same both in the upper- 
and lower-bound scenarios. In terms of age, there is a slight increase in the youngest 
cohort age 18-29 from making up 45.6% of recipients to 47.7%, corresponding to small 
decreases in the proportion of recipients ages 29-59. The gender composition is almost 
identical in the lower-bound scenario as in the upper-bound one, with the proportion 
of eligible female recipients being 62.2%, as is the racial breakdown of the eligible 
recipients with only small changes for all groups. There is a very slight increase in the 
proportion of eligible negative income tax recipients living in traditional areas from 
39.15% to 40.33%.  
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Figures 4.7-4.11: Demographic characteristics of individuals eligible to receive the lower-bound 

















Impact on inequality 
The Gini coefficient of household income calculated after tax and transfers, but before 
the negative income tax is implemented, is 0.6621. This is similar to the Gini coefficient 
calculated in Hundenborn, Leibbrandt, and Woolard (2016). After introducing the 
upper-bound negative income tax, the Gini coefficient drops to 0.59, a 10.6% reduction. 
This is a very large decrease, especially considering that this decrease in the Gini 
coefficient results only from introducing the income subsidies, and does not yet include 
its financing. If the negative income tax was to be fully or partly financed progressively 
through the personal income tax system, the decrease in the Gini coefficient would be 
considerably higher.   
The lower-bound negative income tax also leads to a significant decrease in income 
inequality, albeit less so than the upper-bound negative income tax. It decreases the 
Gini coefficient from 0.66 to 0.62, a decrease of 6.1%. While this is a smaller effect, it is 
still large. Again, it should be noted that this reduction in inequality is the result of 
merely introducing the income subsidy, and that a progressively financed negative 
income tax would likely reduce inequality further. Figure 4.12 below illustrates the 
Lorenz curves for household incomes with and without the negative income tax. Both 
the upper- and lower-bound negative income tax proposals are included for 
comparison.  
                                                          




Figure 4.12 Lorenz curves of per capita household incomes before and after two types of negative 
income tax. Own calculations using Wave 4 survey weights. 
The reduction in income inequality resulting from a negative income tax can also be 
shown by looking at income share tables. In table 4.1, we see that the introduction of 
both the lower- and upper-bound negative income tax increases the total income share 
of the bottom 50% of the population, while reducing the income share of the top 10% of 
the population. The shares of the “middle 40%” from deciles 5-9 increases marginally 
with the upper-bound income tax. A more detailed overview is seen in table 4.2, which 
further divides the income shares by deciles. Notably, all but the top 3 deciles increase 
their income shares – both in the case of the lower-bound and the upper-bound negative 
income tax. Importantly, the bottom 10% of income earners more than doubles their 
share of total income, from 0.8% before a negative income tax to 1.7% after the upper-
bound negative income tax. The income shares of the top 30% of earners all decrease, 
but the most significant change can be seen for the top 10% of earners, whose share 
decreases from 55.3% before any negative income tax to 50.8% with the upper-bound 
negative income tax. 
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Table 4.1 Impact of a negative income tax on income shares 1 
 Income shares  
Percentiles Before negative 
income tax  
With upper-bound 
negative income tax  
With lower-bound 
negative income tax  
P0-50 10.0% 14.3% 12.3% 
P50-90 34.7% 34.9% 34.7% 
P90-100 55.3% 50.8% 53.0% 
Source: Own calculations using NIDS Wave 4 with Wave 4 survey weights 
 
Table 4.2 Impact of a negative income tax on income shares 2 
 Income shares  
Percentiles Before negative 
income tax  
With upper-bound 
negative income tax  
With lower-bound 
negative income tax  
P0-10 0.8% 1.7% 1.3% 
P10-20 1.4% 2.3% 1.9% 
P20-30 1.9% 2.8% 2.4% 
P30-40 2.6% 3.4% 3.0% 
P40-50 3.3% 4.2% 3.7% 
P50-60 4.4% 5.0% 4.7% 
P60-70 6.0% 6.5% 6.2% 
P70-80 9.1% 9.0% 9.0% 
P80-90 15.2% 14.5% 14.8% 
P90-100 55.3% 50.8% 53.0% 
Source: Own calculations using NIDS Wave 4 with Wave 4 survey weights 
Impact on poverty 
The upper-bound negative income tax has a large impact on poverty, as seen in table 
4.3. Using the upper-bound poverty line of R1309 shows that introducing the negative 
income tax reduces headcount poverty by 12.8 percentage points (or by 24 percent) from 
52.9% to 40.1%. While the reduction in the poverty headcount is fairly high, it might 
seem lower than expected given that the negative income tax is set at an amount which 
brings up all recipients to the R1309 poverty line. However, it is important to remember 
that since the criteria for receiving an income subsidy is individual income rather than 
household income, many eligible individuals in households with members younger than 
18 or older than 60 years old will share their subsidy with non-recipients, leading to a 
smaller reduction in the poverty headcount. The negative income tax does not just 
reduce the number of people living in poverty, but also reduces the depth of poverty, as 
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measured by the poverty gap ratio. It almost halves the poverty gap ratio which 
decreases by 12.9 percentage points from 26.1% to 13.2%. The severity of poverty also 
decreases significantly with the upper-bound negative income tax. The poverty severity 
ratio (also known as the squared poverty gap) decreases by 10.2 percentage points from 
15.8% to 5.6% with the introduction of the negative income tax. If using one of the other 
poverty lines, either the lower-bound poverty line or the food poverty line, the results 
are even more distinct. In particular, extreme poverty – as measured by the amount of 
people living below the food-poverty line – is virtually eliminated. Before the 
introduction of the upper-bound negative income tax, the headcount ratio using the 
food poverty line is 14.0%, while it decreases to 0.9% with the introduction of the upper-
bound negative income tax.  
Table 4.3 Impact of the upper-bound negative income tax on poverty 
Poverty measure Before negative income 
tax 
After negative income 
tax 
Headcount ratio (P0)   
        Upper-bound poverty line, R1309 52.9% 40.1% 
        Lower-bound poverty line, R670 29.7% 8.4% 
       Food-poverty line, R423 14.0% 0.9% 
Poverty gap ratio (P1)   
        Upper-bound poverty line, R1309 26.1% 13.2% 
        Lower-bound poverty line, R670 10.7% 1.5% 
       Food-poverty line, R423 4.1% 0.2% 
Poverty severity ratio (P2)   
        Upper-bound poverty line, R1309 15.8% 5.6% 
        Lower-bound poverty line, R670 5.3% 0.5% 
       Food-poverty line, R423 1.8% 0.1% 
Source: Own calculations using NIDS Wave 4 with Wave 4 survey weights. Poverty lines from Budlender, Leibbrandt and 
Woolard (2015) have been inflated to 2015 prices. All poverty lines are per capita. 
As seen in table 4.4, the lower-bound negative income tax also has a significant impact 
on poverty. Naturally, it is smaller than that of the upper-bound negative income tax. A 
large difference is that the lower-bound negative income tax does not profoundly alter 
the headcount ratio for the upper-bound poverty line, as it only decreases from 52.9% 
to 47% with its introduction. This result is unsurprising, since the lower-bound negative 
income tax is set at a level lower than the upper-bound poverty line. Looking at the 
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impact of the negative income tax  on the lower-bound poverty line, however, we can 
see that it makes a large difference – the headcount ratio decreases by 11.3 percentage 
points (or 38%) from 29.7% to 18.4%. As with the upper-bound negative income tax, the 
lower-bound negative income tax virtually eliminates extreme poverty as measured by 
the headcount of people living below the food-poverty line. After the introduction of 
the negative income tax, it decreases from 14.0% to 3.4%. The lower-bound negative 
income tax also decreases the depth and severity of poverty. This is especially the case 
when considering the poverty gap and poverty severity ratios using the lower-bound 
poverty line, but it also makes a significant difference on the poverty measures which 
use the upper-bound poverty line. With the introduction of the negative income tax the 
poverty gap ratio decreases from 26.1% to 19.3%, and the poverty severity ratio decreases 
from 15.8% to 9.7%. As with the upper-bound negative income tax, introducing this 
negative income tax virtually eliminates extreme poverty as measured by the headcount 
of people living below the food-poverty line. After the introduction of the negative 
income tax, it decreases from 14.0% to 3.4%.  
Table 4.4 Impact of the lower-income negative income tax on poverty 
Poverty measure Before negative income 
tax 
After negative income 
tax 
Headcount ratio (P0)   
        Upper-bound poverty line, R1309 52.9% 47.7% 
        Lower-bound poverty line, R670 29.7% 18.4% 
       Food-poverty line, R423 14.0% 3.4% 
Poverty gap ratio (P1)   
        Upper-bound poverty line, R1309 26.1% 19.3% 
        Lower-bound poverty line, R670 10.7% 4.3% 
       Food-poverty line, R423 4.1% 0.6% 
Poverty severity ratio (P2)   
        Upper-bound poverty line, R1309 15.8% 9.7% 
        Lower-bound poverty line, R670 5.3% 1.5% 
       Food-poverty line, R423 1.8% 0.2% 
Source: Own calculations using NIDS Wave 4 with Wave 4 survey weights. Poverty lines from Budlender, Leibbrandt and 
Woolard (2015) have been inflated to 2015 prices. All poverty lines are per capita. 
Discussion 
As noted in the methodology chapter, the microsimulations used in this paper are static 
non-behavioural microsimulations. This means that the results found should be 
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interpreted as first-round effects without behavioural changes or changes in the 
underlying population. The main reason for not including a behavioural response is the 
lack of reliable estimates, and therefore, that including them would lead to speculation. 
However, individuals’ labour supply response to income subsidies have been given 
significant space and interest both in the South African and international literature, and 
it should be addressed. Since a negative income tax in South Africa does not currently 
exist, an option for gaining information about behavioural effects at the lower end of 
the income distribution is to look at the research conducted on the old age pension.  
The old age pension is of a similar size to the guaranteed subsidy suggested for the 
negative income tax. The findings in Bertrand, Mullainathan and Miller (2003) show 
that household members of old age pension recipients decrease their labour supply 
when a household member becomes eligible, and results from Klasen and Woolard 
(2009) show that social grants may lead the unemployed to base their location on the 
location of the grant recipient, rather than the most optimal location for job search. On 
the other hand, the results in Posel, Fairburn and Lund (2006) and Ardington, Case and 
Hosegood (2009) suggest that an extra income source in the household such as the old 
age pension may increase labour supply, primarily through enabling migration. This 
suggests that it is not obvious that an income subsidy like a negative income tax will 
reduce labour supply in South Africa. However, the concern that a negative income tax 
will decrease labour supply may be even higher than for other grants as it directly targets 
the working-age population. This is a valid concern and it may very well be the case that 
some individuals will forego work to receive the grant. Nevertheless, most of the 
unemployment in South Africa is structural (Banerjee et al., 2006), suggesting that the 
benefits of providing social support for this large group traditionally left behind by the 
social security system may outweigh the potential disadvantages of a negative labour 
supply effect. 
On another note, the estimated cost of the negative income tax assumes full uptake by 
eligible recipients. It is fairly realistic to assume that benefits uptake will be high when 
conditions for eligibility are few, an assumption supported by the high uptake of other 
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social grants in South Africa22. Still, some eligible recipients may decide to forego it. This 
may hold especially true for those with relatively high household incomes compared to 
the negative income tax, or those on the threshold margins who are only eligible for a 
very small grant. If this is the case, one would expect the total cost to be lower. It may 
also be the case that some individuals will underreport their incomes to become eligible 
for the negative income tax. If this is the case, one would expect the total cost to be 
higher.  
 
In conclusion, a negative income tax has the potential to significantly decrease both 
inequality and poverty in South Africa, but these gains come at a high cost. Using only 
income and age as eligibility requirements proves to be fairly effective, as the negative 
income tax reaches a young, majority African demographic which is mostly unemployed 
or not economically active. Lacking information about behavioural effects makes it 
difficult to make predictions about its impact on recipients’ labour supply, but if studies 









                                                          
22According to South African Social Security Agency, 17.1 million social grants were given 
January 2017, of which 3.3 million were old age grants, 12 million were child support grants, 
and 1.1 million were disability grants. (South African Social Security Agency, 2017) 
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Chapter 5  
Increased tax rates for top earners 
How to tax individuals with high incomes is an ever-contentious topic. It touches on 
people’s inherent sense of fairness, especially in a highly unequal country as South 
Africa. However, there is often a lack of clarity in who the said high income individuals 
are. In public discourse, the lack of clarity is often compounded by the fact that people 
often do not know what the income distribution looks like, or have difficulty with 
placing themselves in it (Slemrod, 2000).  
Where exactly we draw the line of who is or is not a high income earner is somewhat 
arbitrary, but it has a significant effect on which results we get. Those with incomes in 
the top 10 and 1 percent of the income distribution are a quite different group than those 
in the top 0.1 and 0.01 percent – in terms of incomes, behaviour, and other 
characteristics (Piketty, 2014; Slemrod, 2000). It is therefore necessary to be clear on 
which definition of “high income earner” is being used. Steenekamp's (2012a) paper, 
which assesses the effects of higher marginal tax rates on top income earners in South 
Africa uses three different definitions: those in the top 1% of the income distribution are 
considered “rich”, while those in the top 0.1% and 0.01% are “very rich” and “super rich”, 
respectively. This dissertation refers to high income earners as those in the top tax 
bracket, as the threshold for getting into this tax bracket is roughly the income which 
places a person in the top 1% of earners.  
While chapter 4 looked at a way to increase progressivity at the bottom end of the 
income distribution, this chapter explores the issue of increasing progressivity from the 
top end of the income distribution by increasing the marginal tax rates for high income 
earners. Chapter 5.1 discusses factors which impact decisions on taxing high income 
earners, focusing especially on the elasticity of taxable income. Chapter 5.2 explains the 
tax proposals and how they are simulated, and chapter 5.3 discusses the results. 
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5.1 How to tax high income earners? 
As Slemrod (2000) points out, the decision of how to tax high income earners depends 
on economic concerns such as the income generation process, behavioural effects of 
taxation, and potential externalities of high income earners. However, it also depends 
on value judgements and notions of social justice, to which economics does not have 
much to contribute. Although any analysis which ignores these aspects is admittedly 
incomplete, it is beyond the scope of this study to deliberate on them. An aspect that 
will be deliberated on, however, is the behavioural effects of taxation. 
The elasticity of taxable income – a key statistic 
The idea of a behavioural effect which reduces the efficiency of taxation comes from the 
optimal taxation literature, which is discussed in chapter 2.2. In the optimal taxation 
literature, the behavioural effects discussed are mostly limited to the labour supply 
effect: when taxes rise, leisure becomes relatively less expensive than work, and the 
individual will reduce their labour supply. In more recent literature, however, there has 
been a shift towards a broader conceptualisation of the behavioural response. This 
broader notion is referred to as the elasticity of taxable income (ETI). It includes all 
behavioural responses to taxation, including changes in labour supply, substitution 
towards activities with preferential tax treatment, changing compensation plans to 
include more untaxed fringe benefits, tax avoidance more generally, tax evasion, and so 
on (Slemrod and Bakija, 2000; Feldstein, 2008; Saez et al., 2012). 
For several reasons, the elasticity of taxable income has particular relevance for 
assessing tax changes for high income earners. Firstly, the empirical literature which 
estimates the size of the elasticity of taxable income has mostly found that it is 
significantly larger for high income earners than it is for the rest of the income 
distribution. High income earners tend to have easier access to legal ways of avoiding 
tax such as changing their compensation plans towards lesser-taxed income sources, 
hiring tax lawyers to find loopholes, timing their responses, and so on. For instance, as 
explored in Esteller, Piolatto, and Rablen (2016), high income earners tend to be much 
more mobile than people in other parts of the income distribution. They can and often 
do work in different countries or legislatures, and have a degree of discretion of where 
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and how to submit their tax returns. This is especially pertinent when an individual 
works part-time in several different locations, as it can make it difficult for tax 
authorities to identify to which location most taxes should be paid (and since the tax 
authorities in different locations may not always cooperate seamlessly). In these 
settings, “... mobility becomes a means through which avoidance can be carried out” 
(Esteller, Piolatto, and Rablen, 2016, p.1). Tax evasion, while traditionally seen as the 
realm of lower income groups (“the poor evade, the rich avoid” (Slemrod, 2000, p.12)) 
may still be more available to higher income groups. Offshore bank accounts, for 
instance, can be very difficult for authorities to detect and control. 
Secondly, the fact that high income earners tend to play a disproportionately large role 
in any economy (Slemrod, 2000), particularly in the paying of taxes, can make any 
behavioural effects of this group problematic for society as a whole. In South Africa, the 
top decile pays 83.6% of total income taxes (Inchauste et al., 2015). If the behavioural 
response to taxation of this group is large, it can be difficult to increase their taxes 
without it having negative effects on government revenue. Another concern is that the 
scope for raising revenue by increasing taxes on high incomes is limited.  Brewer and 
Browne (2009) look at this in the example of a UK top tax on incomes above £150 000. 
They argue that there is great uncertainty about how much revenue can feasibly be 
collected from this type of tax. They further suggest that the elasticity used by Treasury 
to calculate revenue impact is unrealistically low, leading calculations to overestimate 
the revenue that can be generated from such a tax. 
The majority of empirical ETI estimates are calculated for a US context, and Saez et al. 
(2012) and Giertz (2009) provide good reviews of the recent literature. The paper by 
Giertz (2009) includes an extensive overview of the different authors’ ETI estimates. He 
finds that while most of the estimates are around 0.4, they range between 0 and 1. 
Several of the authors mentioned in his study provide estimates for high income earners: 
Auten, Carroll, and Gee (2008) find a population-weighted ETI of 0.35, but the ETI for 
individuals with incomes above $200 000 is much larger at 1.09. Gruber and Saez (2000) 
find an ETI of 0.57 for earners with incomes above $100 000, compared to 0.4 for all 
earners. Saez (2004) estimates that the ETI for earners in the top 1% of the income 
64 
 
distribution is 1.58, but this decreases to 0.62 when a time trend is included. He further 
finds that the estimate changes when the top 1% is disaggregated into different groups. 
Overall, Giertz concludes that the recent research suggests smaller estimates than those 
by Feldstein (1995) and Lindsey (1987), and that the ETI increases with income. He 
notes, however, that since the ETI is very sensitive to a range of factors, “the range of 
plausible estimates ... is broad” (Giertz, 2009, p.131). Saez, Slemrod, and Giertz (2012) 
critically evaluate the same literature as Giertz, and conclude that the best available 
estimates of the ETI lie between 0.12 and 0.40. In addition to reviewing US studies, they 
also look at a recent Danish study on the ETI by Kleven and Schultz (2011), which finds 
a population estimate that is smaller than those in most US studies. It does however, 
find a similar trend with the elasticities for high income earners, which are 
“monotonically increasing in income level and are two to three times larger in the top 
quintile of the distribution than in the bottom quintile of the distribution“ (Saez, 
Slemrod, and Giertz, 2012, p.41).  
As mentioned by Giertz (2009), the ETI estimates are sensitive to the parameters used, 
including how taxable income is defined, which may vary from country to country. This 
is a crucial point, especially when we consider applying knowledge from the US 
experimental literature to the South African context. Steenekamp (2012a), in lieu of a 
reasonable ETI estimate for South Africa, looks to the results from the U.S. and the U.K., 
and argues that an elasticity of 0.4 is realistic. He further argues that the elasticity for 
high income earners is likely to be relatively high in South Africa, considering the 
smallness of the tax base, mobility of high income earners, and the various possible ways 
to shift income.  
While it is clearly difficult to come up with a good ETI estimate without sufficient 
empirical evidence, extrapolating ETIs from one country to another must be done with 
caution. As Saez et al. (2012, p.40) note, there is no reason to assume that ETI estimates 
will be transferable between countries, since they are “function[s] not only of arguably 
relatively uniform aspects of preferences, but also of the details of countries’ tax 
systems“. Steenekamp’s solution to this issue is to present his results for three different 
elasticities of 0.2, 0.4, and 0.8. Based on these ETI estimates, he finds that the extra 
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revenue gained from increasing top marginal tax rates would be negligible or negative. 
If one wants to include a behavioural response, Steenekamp’s solution of presenting 
different potential elasticities to show their impacts on the results may be the best 
possible option when no ETI estimate is available. In this dissertation, however, no 
behavioural effect is included. 
While grouping different behavioural effects into one elasticity is convenient and makes 
for a conceptually simple statistic, not everyone agrees that it is the best way to assess 
the cost of income taxation. Saez, Slemrod and Giertz (2012) and Piketty, Saez and 
Stantcheva (2014)  are sceptical as to its usefulness in making policy recommendations. 
They argue that different types of behavioural responses call for different policy 
recommendations, and that therefore, grouping them all together is a mistake. Saez, 
Slemrod and Giertz (2012, p.42) note that “the anatomy of behavioural response” is 
irrelevant in the narrow perspective where the tax system is fixed, since all responses 
will be indications of the tax system’s inefficiency. However, when assessing potential 
changes to the tax system, the type of behavioural response is indeed very relevant. 
Specifically, they find that timing and avoidance are the most common behavioural 
responses to large tax reforms in the U.S. When this is the dominating behavioural 
response, they argue that the best policy response is to broaden the tax base and reduce 
avoidance possibilities rather than reduce taxes.  
This sentiment is echoed in Piketty, Saez, and Stantcheva (2014) who present another 
behavioural response to taxation in the form of compensation bargaining. The essence 
of this behavioural response is that decreased top marginal income tax rates will lead to 
increased compensation bargaining by high income earners, since additional 
compensation is taxed at lower rates than before. Because increased compensation 
bargaining and therefore higher top incomes is not a reflection of higher productivity, 
it follows that the top marginal tax rates should be kept high to discourage this type of 
bargaining by decreasing its rewards. Malloy (2016) takes the argument further by 
arguing that lower top marginal tax rates reduces the bargaining power of labour 
relative to the firm, and that any resulting increases in top incomes will come at the 
expense of workers and their incomes. Therefore, top marginal tax rates should be kept 
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high. Saez, Slemrod, and Giertz (2012) additionally emphasise that externalities of the 
behavioural responses are relevant, but that these are not considered in ETI 
calculations. For instance, if increased taxation results in a shift towards increased 
charitable giving (or other “good” tax-deductible activities) it is not obvious that welfare 
is decreased. For all the reasons mentioned above, the elasticity of taxable income 
should be used with care.  
Other considerations 
While the behavioural response to taxation is naturally a very important part of the 
discussion on how to tax high income earners, other economic considerations also play 
a role. One of the most important factors in this regard is the income generation 
process, and where the high incomes in question come from – particularly whether top 
incomes were acquired through productive or innovative means (e.g. the “superstar” 
theory) or by luck or any unproductive or destructive manner. In classic economic 
theory, wages reflect individuals’ marginal productivity, and high incomes, which come 
as a result of higher marginal productivity, should not be punished by higher levels of 
taxation. This corresponds to the “superstar theory”,  which explains top incomes by 
arguing that they are reflective of people who are “superstars” or entrepreneurs in their 
fields, and therefore receive high levels of remuneration (Mankiw, 2013; Kaplan and 
Rauh, 2013). However, as argued by for instance Alvaredo, Atkinson, and Piketty (2013) 
and Piketty, Saez, and Stantcheva (2014), high top incomes which result from bargaining 
power on the part of high income earners without it necessarily being reflected in their 
productivity weakens the argument for avoiding high top income tax rates. In a similar 
vein, if high incomes result from unproductive and destructive activities such as rent-
seeking and corruption, or from unfair advantages of some group over another rather 
than higher productivity, higher taxation of top incomes may be recommended. On the 
other hand, as Mankiw (2013) points out, in this case the solution may not necessarily 
be to increase higher taxation of top incomes, but rather address the inefficiency 
directly. While this is certainly a valid point, in many instances it is not as simple as 




Lastly, potential externalities from high income earners are relevant in the discussion 
of top income taxation. An oft-raised argument is that high income earners have 
positive externalities on the rest of society, particularly when it comes to innovation and 
job creation. If this is the case, high levels of taxation for high income earners can have 
negative effects not only on the high income earners themselves and revenue collection, 
but also on jobs or other societal goods, and lower taxation of high income individual is 
recommended (Slemrod, 2000). However, there are also potential negative externalities 
of (very) high incomes which advocate higher levels of taxation for these earners, for 
instance a disproportionately large influence on the political system. In the case of large 
negative externalities of high incomes, higher top marginal tax rates should be 
considered.  
5.2 Methodology 
Having outlined some of the considerations facing policymakers wishing to tax high 
income earners in chapter 5.1, chapter 5.3 simulates seven different policy suggestions 
for how the personal income tax code can be amended to increase progressivity by 
targeting the top end of the income distribution. The policies are simulated both to 
investigate how much more inequality can be reduced by increasing progressivity, and 
how much additional revenue can be collected from them. Because of this, the proposed 
changes are all fairly ambitious in how high the top marginal tax rates are set. The seven 
proposals can be separated into three groups, where the two first groups only alter the 
marginal tax rates for the existing tax thresholds. The third group adds an extra tax 
bracket aimed at the very top end of the income distribution – the top 0.1%. As noted in 
the beginning of this chapter, where the line for who is a high income earner is drawn 
is somewhat arbitrary, but the top 10%, 1%, and 0.1% are all very different groups in 
terms of earnings, behaviour, and other characteristics. Since the current top income 
tax threshold is set around the level of the top 1% of income earners23, it is interesting 
to explore the possibility of setting an extra threshold at the level of the top 0.1% of 
earners. This is furthermore compelling because while the top 1% of earners in South 
                                                          
23 Income to be in the top tax threshold is R701 301, and to be in top 1% R748 383 (own 
calculations using NIDS Wave 4 and the wave 4 survey weights) 
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Africa are fortunate in relative terms, the income threshold needed to get to this part of 
the distribution is unlikely to correspond to popular perceptions of “the rich”. Society’s 
willingness to accept high tax rates may be higher for those they perceive as very wealthy 
compared to those merely perceived as more fortunate. The estimates for the revenue 
increases are calculated by applying the prospective tax codes to the base dataset as 
constructed in chapter 1, summing the differences of the change in tax liability for the 
affected group using Wave 4 Survey Weights. 
The first two tax policy proposals involve increasing the top marginal tax rate from 41% 
to 45%. Proposal 1 only increases the marginal tax rate for the top tax bracket, while the 
marginal tax rates for all other brackets stay constant. Proposal 2 increases the marginal 
tax rates for the top three tax brackets – the marginal tax rate increases by 1, 2, and 4 
percentage points for the fourth, fifth, and sixth tax bracket, respectively. The marginal 
tax rates facing the different taxpayers with proposals 1 and 2, as well as in the existing 
tax code, are illustrated in table 3 below.  
Table 5.1 Tax proposals, group 1 
 Existing system 
(2016) 
Proposal 1 Proposal 2 
Tax brackets    
1: <181 900 0.18 0.18 0.18 
2: 181 901-284 100 0.26 0.26 0.26 
3: 284 101-393 200 0.31 0.31 0.31 
4: 393 201-550 100 0.36 0.36 0.37 
5: 550 101 - 701 300 0.39 0.39 0.41 
6: >701 301 0.41 0.45 0.45 
Source: Budget Review 2016 and own proposals 
Group 2 of the tax proposals simulate a substantial increase in the top marginal tax rates 
of 9 percentage points compared to the 2016 tax code. This is a radical proposal, but it 
is included to illustrate how it would affect inequality and tax revenue. It is further 
assumed that if this were a tax code the government would be interested in 
implementing, the change would not happen overnight, but rather incrementally. 
Proposal 3 only increases the marginal tax for the top tax bracket, while proposal 4 also 
increases the marginal tax rate for bracket 5 from 39% to 45%. Proposal 5 additionally 
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Table 5.2 Tax proposals, group 2 
 Existing system  
(2016) 
Proposal 3 Proposal 4 Proposal 5 
Tax brackets     
1: <181 900 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 
2: 181 901-284 100 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26 
3: 284 101-393 200 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.35 
4: 393 201-550 100 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.4 
5: 550 101 - 701 300 0.39 0.39 0.45 0.45 
6: > 701 301 0.41 0.50 0.50 0.50 
Source: Budget Review 2016 and own proposals 
The last two tax proposals differ from the other five in that they include adding an 
additional bracket for earners who are in the top 0.1% of the income distribution. Since 
the top 0.1% of incomes start at R2 123 69224, this is also where the new tax bracket starts. 
Individuals with incomes above this threshold face a tax rate significantly higher than 
the original top tax bracket at 55%. Additionally, proposal 6 also increases the marginal 
tax rate of the sixth tax bracket to 0.45. Proposal 7 increases the marginal tax rates for 
the first tax bracket by 1%, the second bracket by 2%, and so on until the sixth tax 
bracket. These proposals can be seen in table 5.3 below.  
Table 5.3 Tax proposals, group 3 
 Existing system 
(2016) 
Proposal 6 Proposal 7 
Tax brackets    
1: <181 900 0.18 0.18 0.19 
2: 181 901-284 100 0.26 0.26 0.28 
3: 284 101-393 200 0.31 0.31 0.34 
4: 393 201-550 100 0.36 0.36 0.40 
5: 550 101 - 701 300 0.39 0.39 0.44 
6: 701 301 – 1 977 872 0.41 0.45 0.47 
7: >1 977 873 N/A 0.55 0.55 
Source: Budget Review 2016 and own proposals 
As with the negative income tax in chapter 4, liability is determined by the gross taxable 
income 𝑔. The decrease in individuals’ net incomes from tax changes are then added 
back to their household incomes, from which pre-and post-tax Gini coefficients and 
                                                          
24 Own calculations using NIDS Wave 4 and the wave 4 survey weights 
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income shares are calculated. The total revenue generated by the tax proposals is 
calculated by summing additional tax payments, and scaling them up to the country 
level using survey weights. 
5.3 Results 
One of the big insights resulting from these simulations is that the potential for both 
increasing government revenue and for increasing progressivity and reducing inequality 
by further increasing tax rates for high income earners is limited – even in the case of 
relatively drastic tax increases at the top end of the income distribution. This suggests 
that there is a limit to how much we can rely on the personal income system to combat 
inequality and ensure a more equal income distribution. It should also be noted that 
these revenue estimates assume no behavioural responses to taxation. 
Group 1: Top marginal tax rates of 45% 
While both proposal 1 and 2 include a fairly large increase in the top marginal tax rates, 
they do not decrease income inequality by much. As mentioned in the previous chapter, 
the Gini coefficient with the existing tax code is 0.66. Proposals 1 and 2 do not alter it, 
as the Gini coefficient after both proposals remains 0.66. Looking at the change in 
income shares after the two proposals reveal a similar picture. Table 5.4 shows that the 
biggest difference is seen for p50-90 that experience an increase in their income share 
of 0.8 percent from 34.73% to 35.01%. As is seen, there is virtually no difference between 
proposal 1 and 2 when it comes to inequality. This is further emphasized in table 5.5, 
which divides the shares into deciles. There is barely a difference in income shares after 
the two proposals, with the biggest difference being p20-30, whose income share 





Table 5.4 Impact of group 1 tax proposals on income shares, 1 
Percentiles Before tax changes After proposal 1 After proposal 2  
P0-50 10.01% 10.09% 10.09% 
P50-90 34.73% 35.01% 35.01% 
P90-100 55.26% 54.90% 54.89% 
Source: Own calculations using NIDS Wave 4 and Wave 4 survey weights 
 
Table 5.5 Impact of group 1 tax proposals on income shares, 2 
Percentiles Before tax changes After proposal 1 After proposal 2  
P0-10 0.83% 0.83% 0.83% 
P10-20 1.40% 1.41% 1.41% 
P20-30 1.89% 1.91% 1.91% 
P30-40 2.55% 2.57% 2.57% 
P40-50 3.34% 3.37% 3.37% 
P50-60 4.42% 4.46% 4.46% 
P60-70 6.03% 6.08% 6.08% 
P70-80 9.05% 9.13% 9.13% 
P80-90 15.23% 15.35% 15.35% 
P90-100 55.26% 54.90% 54.89% 
Source: Own calculations using NIDS Wave 4 and Wave 4 survey weights 
Estimated revenue from personal income tax from own calculations is R334.0 billion.2526 
Estimated tax revenue with proposal 1 is R350.9 billion, meaning that the changes to the 
tax code would collect an additional R16.9 billion. Proposal 2 would collect slightly 
more, with estimated tax revenue being R351.1 billion, an increase of R17.1 billion from 
the 2016 tax code. 
Group 2: Top marginal tax rates of 50% 
All three proposals in group 2 reduce inequality by more than proposals 1 and 2, but 
perhaps by less than one would expect from such a large change in tax policy. All 
proposals reduce the Gini coefficient from 0.66 to 0.65. As seen in table 5.6, proposals 3 
to 5 increase the shares of percentiles P0-50 and P50-90 by approximately the same 
                                                          
25In 2015 Rands 
26This estimate differs a bit from personal income tax revenue estimates from the 2015 Budget 
Review, where the estimated revenue from the personal income tax is R350.0 billion. 
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amount. Proposal 3 increases income shares of p0-50 by 1.8% from 10.01% to 10.19%, 
while proposals 4 and 5 increase their share by 1.9%. The income shares of p50-90 
increase by 1.84%, 1.87%, and 1.9% with proposals 3, 4 and 5, respectively. This can be 
seen in table 5.6 below. Looking at the changes in income shares by deciles in table 5.7, 
we can see that the difference between proposals 4, 5, and 6 are miniscule. The deciles 
that see the biggest changes are p20-30 and p40-50, which both see their income shares 
increase by 2.1%.  
Table 5.6 Impact of group 2 tax proposals on income shares, 1 




After proposal 4 After proposal 5  
P0-50 10.01% 10.19% 10.20% 10.20% 
P50-90 34.73% 35.37% 35.38% 35.39% 
P90-100 55.26% 54.43% 54.42% 54.41% 
Source: Own calculations using NIDS Wave 4 and Wave 4 survey weights 
 
  
Table 5.7 Impact of group 2 tax proposals on income shares, 2 




After proposal 4 After proposal 
5 
P0-10 0.83% 0.84% 0.84% 0.84% 
P10-20 1.40% 1.42% 1.42% 1.42% 
P20-30 1.89% 1.93% 1.93% 1.93% 
P30-40 2.55% 2.60% 2.60% 2.60% 
P40-50 3.34% 3.41% 3.41% 3.41% 
P50-60 4.42% 4.50% 4.51% 4.51% 
P60-70 6.03% 6.14% 6.14% 6.14% 
P70-80 9.05% 9.22% 9.22% 9.23% 
P80-90 15.23% 15.51% 15.51% 15.51% 
P90-100 55.26% 54.43% 54.42% 54.41% 
Source: Own calculations using NIDS Wave 4 and Wave 4 survey weights  
 
Proposals 3, 4, and 5 lead to significant increases in revenue collection, however. The 
estimated revenues from tax proposals 3 and 4 are R372 billion and R372.4 billion, 
increases of R38 and R38.4 billion from the 2016 tax code. Proposal 5 increases tax 




Group 3: An additional tax bracket for the top 0.1% 
The proposals in group 3 have similar impacts on overall inequality as group 2, as they 
both decrease the Gini coefficient to 0.65. This is notable, as it shows that even these 
radical changes to personal income tax can only reduce inequality by so much. Tables 
5.8 and 5.9 show how income shares by percentiles change with the introduction of 
proposals 6 and 7. We can see that proposal 7 impacts the income shares slightly more 
than proposal 6. The income share of p0-50 increases by 2.1 percent from 10.01% to 
10.22%, and the share of p50-90 increases by 1.8 percent from 34.73% to 35.37%. Proposal 
7 also reduces the income share of p90-100 by 1.6% from 55.26% to 54.40%. Looking at 
table 5.9, we see that the deciles that experience the biggest change because of proposal 
7 is the p0-10 and p40-50 who both increase their income shares by 2.15% (from 0.83% 
to 0.85% and from 2.55% to 2.61%).   
 
Table 5.8 Impact of group 3 tax proposals on income shares, 1 
Percentiles Existing system (2016) Proposal 6 Proposal 7 
P0-50 10.01% 10.20% 10.22% 
P50-90 34.73% 35.38% 35.37% 
P90-100 55.26% 54.42% 54.40% 
Source: Own calculations using NIDS wave 4 and Wave 4 survey weights   
 
Table 5.9 Impact of group 4 tax proposals on income shares, 2 
Percentiles Existing system (2016) Proposal 6 Proposal 7 
P0-10 0.83% 0.84% 0.85% 
P10-20 1.40% 1.42% 1.43% 
P20-30 1.89% 1.93% 1.93% 
P30-40 2.55% 2.60% 2.61% 
P40-50 3.34% 3.40% 3.41% 
P50-60 4.42% 4.50% 4.51% 
P60-70 6.03% 6.14% 6.15% 
P70-80 9.05% 9.22% 9.22% 
P80-90 15.23% 15.51% 15.49% 
P90-100 55.26% 54.42% 54.40% 




Both proposals 6 and 7 increase revenue significantly. Proposal 6 increases revenue to 
R362.3 Billion, which is a R28.3 Billion increase from the 2016 tax code. Proposal 7 
increases revenue by R35 Billion, collecting a total of R369 Billion.  
Discussion: Behavioural effects and the elasticity of taxable income 
The calculations of the revenue generated from changing personal income tax assumes 
that there is no behavioural response to taxation. This may be a realistic assumption to 
apply to a short-term scenario, but in the longer term one would assume that there 
might be some type of behavioural response which can impact the tax changes’ 
redistributive impact. This is consistent with cross-country evidence that disincentive 
effects “off-set but do not outweigh First-order redistributive effects” (Förster. and Tóth, 
2015, p.1804). When discussing the elasticity of taxable income earlier in this chapter, it 
was noted that one might expect a larger behavioural response from high income 
groups, which was also seen in empirical ETI estimates. As such, the estimates for 
revenue collection in this sub-chapter may overstate the revenue that can be generated 
from the proposed tax policies.  
On a related note, it is also necessary to be cautious of the numbers for revenue 
generation since high income earners may be under-sampled in the NIDS dataset and 
that any calculation based on those groups (in particular when considering very high 
incomes, such as the top 0.1% of income earners) will rely heavily on the few 







Chapter 6  
A combined proposal: a negative 
income tax financed by top tax 
increases  
Chapter 4 showed that the negative income tax proposals are very costly. From the 
simulations of the different tax change proposals at the top end of the income 
distribution in chapter 5, it becomes clear that the extra revenue generated cannot 
feasibly finance a negative income tax of the proposed sizes. Hence, the negative income 
tax must either be financed through some other means than the personal income tax 
system, or it must be adjusted to fit a more realistic budget based on the additional 
revenue that can be collected from it. Since simulating a negative income tax financed 
through outside means is beyond the scope of the study, this chapter looks at the latter 
and simulates a negative income tax financed by increases in top taxes. Chapter 6.1 
briefly explains what such a negative income tax would look like, and chapter 6.2 
discusses the results.  
6.1 Methodology 
Due to the appeal of the tax that specifically targets the very top end of the income 
distribution – the top 0.1% - the simulation in this chapter uses tax proposal 7 from 
chapter 5. Given that the additional revenue generated by this tax proposal is R35 billion, 
any negative tax that can be financed by it is significantly smaller than those proposed 
in chapter 4. Based on the revenue generated by proposal 7, the proposed negative 
income tax in this simulation has a guaranteed subsidy of R250 per month. Save for the 
difference in subsidy size, the negative income tax simulated is identical to the two 
previously simulated in chapter 4. If an individual is between age 18 and 59 and has an 
income of less than R250 per month, they will receive the difference required to bring 
them up to a monthly income of R250. If they earn zero income, they will receive the 
full subsidy of R250. Similarly to chapters 4 and 5, net income changes for individuals 
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due to the policies are added to their household income variables. From there, the 
inequality indicators (Gini coefficients and income shares) and poverty indicators 
(headcount poverty ratio, poverty gap ratio, and poverty severity ratio) are calculated. 
6.2 Results 
The total cost of the new negative income tax is R2.83 billion per month, or R33.93 
Billion per year.  With this policy, 11.5 million people are eligible to receive some sort of 
income subsidy, and the mean subsidy received is R245.8. The clear majority of 
recipients, 11.1 million people, are eligible to receive the full amount of R250 per month.  
Impact on income inequality 
In the previous subchapter, it was noted that tax proposal 7 on its own decreases the 
Gini coefficient from 0.66 to 0.65. Similarly, the R250 negative income tax on its own 
decreases the Gini coefficient from 0.66 to 0.65. As such, we can see that even a relatively 
small negative income tax can reduce inequality equally as much as a drastic change to 
personal income tax at the top end of the income distribution. Simulating now the 
scenario where the tax proposal finances the negative income tax, we see that their 
combined impact decreases the Gini coefficient to 0.64, a change of 3.0%. This is 
illustrated in figure 6.1, which illustrates the Lorenz curves for per capita household 
incomes before and after the proposed negative income tax and tax change is 
implemented. The post-proposal Lorenz curve visibly shift inwards, indicating reduced 
inequality and increased progressivity, but by significantly less than the negative 




Figure 6.1 Lorenz curves before and after combined negative income tax and personal income tax. Own 
calculations using NIDS Wave 4 and Wave 4 survey weights. 
The percentage shares in table 6.1 and 6.2 show that the policy suggestion is working as 
intended. The income share of p0-50 increases by 10.8 percent from 10.01% to 11.09%, 
while the income share of the p90-100 decreases by 3.1 percent from 55.26% to 53.54%. 
Taking a closer look at table 6.2, we can see that p0-10 of the income distribution is the 
decile whose income share increases the most. Their income share increases by 28% 
from 0.83% to 1.06%. Similarly, p10-20 and p20-30 increase their shares by 16% and 11%, 
respectively. Going upwards through the deciles, we can see that each decile increases 
their shares by less than the previous one, and that the top decile is the only one whose 





Table 6.1 Impact of combined negative income tax and personal income tax on income shares, 1 
Percentiles Existing system (2016) Combined negative income tax  + 
personal income tax  proposal 
P0-50 10.01% 11.09% 
P50-90 34.73% 35.37% 
P90-100 55.26% 53.54% 
Source: Own calculations using NIDS Wave 4 and Wave 4 survey weights 
     
Table 6.2 Impact of combined negative income tax and personal income tax on income shares, 2 
Percentiles Existing system (2016) Combined negative income tax  + 
personal income tax  proposal 
P0-10 0.83% 1.06% 
P10-20 1.40% 1.62% 
P20-30 1.89% 2.10% 
P30-40 2.55% 2.76% 
P40-50 3.34% 3.56% 
P50-60 4.42% 4.61% 
P60-70 6.03% 6.21% 
P70-80 9.05% 9.19% 
P80-90 15.23% 15.35% 
P90-100 55.26% 53.54% 
Source: Own calculations using NIDS Wave 4 and Wave 4 survey weights   
Impact on poverty 
Naturally, setting the negative maximum negative income tax at a lower level than the 
poverty lines means that its poverty-reducing potential, as measured by the headcount 
ratio, will be limited. This can be seen in table 6.3. Using the upper-bound poverty line, 
the headcount ratio decreases from 52.90% to 51.25%. The headcount ratio using the 
lower-bound and food poverty lines decreases from 29.70% to 26.15% and from 14.00% 
to 9.89%, respectively. However, looking at the depth and severity of poverty as 
measured by the poverty gap ratio and poverty severity ratio, we see that the poverty 
gap ratio using the upper-bound poverty line decreases from 26.10% to 23.51%, while the 
poverty severity ratio using the same poverty line decreases from 15.80% to 13.32%. The 
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effects on the poverty gap and poverty severity ratio are larger when using the lower-
bound and food poverty lines.  
Table 6.3 Impact of combined negative income tax and personal income tax on poverty 
Poverty measure Before  After combined proposal 
Headcount ratio (P0)     
        Upper-bound poverty line, R1309 52.90% 51.25% 
        Lower-bound poverty line, R670 29.70% 26.15% 
       Food-poverty line, R423 14.00% 9.89% 
Poverty gap ratio (P1)     
        Upper-bound poverty line, R1309 26.10% 23.51% 
        Lower-bound poverty line, R670 10.70% 7.91% 
       Food-poverty line, R423 4.10% 2.15% 
Poverty severity ratio (P2)     
        Upper-bound poverty line, R1309 15.80% 13.32% 
        Lower-bound poverty line, R670 5.30% 3.33% 
       Food-poverty line, R423 1.80% 0.73% 
Source: Own calculations using NIDS Wave 4 and Wave 4 survey weights. Poverty lines from Budlender, Leibbrandt and 
Woolard (2015) have been inflated to 2015 prices. All poverty lines are per capita. 
 
In conclusion, a negative income tax with a smaller income subsidy size, as simulated 
in this chapter, will naturally have a smaller impact on income inequality and poverty 
than those simulated in chapter 4. However, combined with increased marginal tax 
rates on top incomes it still makes significant gains – in particular for income 
inequality. Furthermore, while R250 per month is hardly a large amount, its impact on 
the income security for individuals with no other reliable income source should not be 




Chapter 7  
Policy discussion and conclusions 
This dissertation aimed to explore the progressivity of the South African personal 
income tax system. It did so by first investigating the changes in progressivity of the 
personal income tax code post-apartheid to present day. Then, a static, arithmetic 
microsimulation model was used to model two policy proposals for increasing 
progressivity of the tax code. One targeted the bottom end of the income distribution 
through a negative income tax, while the other targeted the top end of the income 
distribution through increased tax rates for high income earners. This chapter starts by 
discussing some of the policy implications of the results found in the dissertation, 
followed by pathways for future research. It ends with concluding remarks. 
7.1 Progressivity and its contradictions 
Numerical measures of progressivity are not interesting in and of themselves. They gain 
relevance when they are used in comparisons with each other. In this dissertation, they 
have been used to investigate the direction in the progressivity of personal income tax 
over the last two decades. This is interesting because it says something about both how 
effective tax policy has been over time, the trade-offs that have been made, and the 
underlying structure of the personal income tax system. The two progressivity measures 
used in this dissertation – pre- and post-tax Gini coefficients and the Kakwani index – 
moved in opposite directions between 1996 and 2017. While the Kakwani index showed 
a steady increase in progressivity over this period, the post-tax Gini coefficient also 
increased, implying a decrease in progressivity. Had it been moving clearly in one 
direction or the other, it would have been much easier to discuss the implications of 
this change. What can we make of these results?   
They suggest that, at least in the South African context, there is a progressivity trade-
off between the increased concentration of taxes and their redistributive impact. 
Furthermore, they show us that we cannot simply say that progressivity has increased 
or decreased. Rather, any assessment of progressivity necessitates a clear judgement of 
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what dimension exactly one wants to assess. Do we want to know how the concentration 
of taxes relative to the concentration of incomes has changed? In that case, the Kakwani 
index is the most useful tool and progressivity in this sense has increased. However, if 
what one really wants to know is whether the tax code has become less or more effective 
at reducing inequalities, the pre- and post-tax Gini coefficients are more useful. The 
system has become less progressive in this sense. When talking about policy suggestions 
which aim to change progressivity, it is necessary to be clear about the value judgements 
inherent in ones choice of progressivity measure. Is the priority to increase 
redistribution or to increase the tax burden of high income earners? These two will not 
always be the same.  
7.2 Merits and challenges of the negative income tax 
From the negative income simulations in chapter 4, we saw that a negative income tax 
can effectively target poor individuals and households, decreasing poverty significantly. 
Further, it was shown to have a very large impact on inequality. This impact is largely 
dependent on its size.  However, we have also seen that these effects do not come 
cheaply, and that the total cost of the simulated policies are much larger than what one 
could expect to be able to raise through personal income tax – even in the case of drastic 
increases in marginal tax rates. So making the negative income tax big enough to have 
substantial impact is very expensive. The large cost of the negative income tax is hardly 
surprising when the income threshold to receive it is set at an amount that will have a 
significant impact on poverty and people’s wellbeing. This was the case with the upper-
bound poverty line of R1309 per month.  
The cost is mostly a direct function of the large number of low- and no-income earners 
in the sample and in the South African population – using the per capita poverty line of 
R1309 per month, the headcount ratio is 52.9%, which corresponds to 29 million people. 
Naturally, any policy targeting and transferring income subsidies to this large group will 
come with a hefty price tag, especially if uptake is large. There is no reason to believe 
that it would not be, given the bureaucratic ease and few criteria of eligibility. As such, 
the cost of the negative income tax is not so much an indictment of the policy itself, as 
a highlight of just how serious is the problem of poverty in South Africa, and that there 
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is simply no cheap and easy way to combat it. In trying to reconcile this large cost with 
the wish for substantive change, a quote by former Social Development Minister Zola 
Skweyiya aptly sums up the crux of the dilemma:  
 “While a comprehensive social security system is too expensive, it is also too 
expensive not to have it, given its ability to reduce poverty and create safety nets 
and stable families and communities” (Department of Social Development, 2007) 
However, even if a negative income tax of the scale proposed in chapter 4 is beyond the 
scope of ambition of policymakers, its set-up and this way of thinking about providing 
income support to low-income earners may still be useful. In particular, basing 
eligibility on the sole basis of income not only has the advantage of being able to reach 
the most vulnerable in society, it is also likely to be less administratively costly in terms 
of monitoring. However, the lack of qualifying criteria may also be its biggest challenge 
in terms of getting policymakers and the general public on board as it is likely to tie into 
people’s notions of the “deserving” and “undeserving” poor. While it is fairly easy to 
justify giving income subsidies to children, the disabled, and the elderly, providing 
grants with no strings attached to able-bodied adults undeniably goes against much of 
the rhetoric surrounding work and poverty in South Africa. Other programmes 
designed to assist the unemployed and low-income adults such as workfare 
programmes, or even the more closely related earned income tax credit (EITC) may be 
an easier sell in this regard. But given the costs of monitoring such programmes, a 
negative income tax is far more likely to give policymakers “bang for their buck”, 
rhetorical issues aside. 
Furthermore, it is quite likely that those qualifying for workfare programmes or income 
subsidies with a work component are not all the same individuals that would qualify for 
a negative income tax. Higher requirements for qualification and lengthy processes to 
prove eligibility may exclude those the policies most seek to reach, an issue less likely 
to be present in the case of the negative income tax. Additionally, the chronic nature of 
under- and unemployment in South Africa is considered to be structural. Subsidies with 
work requirements may indeed be suitable for a context where one worries about lack 
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of willingness to work. However, in the South African context it may simply provide a 
solution to a problem that ought not to be the highest priority.  
Lastly, a negative income tax does not only give a degree of income stability on an 
individual level, or help combat poverty and inequality on a national level. There are 
potential benefits to having it as an integrated part of the personal income tax system, 
as it would involve bringing many more people into the tax system than is currently the 
case. This may have benefits both in terms of increasing information about earnings and 
income, as well as potentially paving the way for future tax compliance. 
7.3 Taxation of top incomes and its limited impact on revenue collection 
Compared to the negative income tax, increased tax rates for high income earners 
impacted income inequality much less, a finding that is consistent with the cross-
country evidence showing that transfers are generally more equalising than income 
taxes (Förster. and Tóth, 2015). It was also shown in chapter 5 that the potential for 
increasing tax revenue through increased tax rates at the top end of the income 
distribution is very limited. This is the case even for substantial rate increases and when 
assuming no behavioural effects, as they were only able to raise between R30 and R39 
billion Rands. This finding is mostly a result of the small number of individuals who 
occupy these tax brackets. Furthermore, the impact of the proposed changes on 
progressivity and inequality is dwarfed by the vast numbers of low-income individuals 
relative to high-income earners. In this regard, we see that there is a trade-off between 
increasing revenue collection and increasing progressivity – any serious revenue-
increasing tax policy will be reliant on using a larger subset of the taxpaying population 
than just the top end of the distribution.  
Of course, increasing tax revenue is not the only reason why one may want to increase 
the tax burden of high income individuals. Higher tax burdens for high income 
individuals can also have a confiscatory effect in the case where society has decided that 
it does not wish to provide incentives for incomes to go beyond a certain level. This may 
be due to a sense of unfairness and justice, or the disproportionate influence very high 
income earners can have on politics and society. It is beyond the scope and outside the 
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field of this study to discuss or speculate about whether this is desirable in the South 
African context.  But it is worth acknowledging that the desire to increase tax rates on 
high income individuals is not always born out of economic theory, but is nevertheless 
important in decision making.  
On the other hand, there are also “economic reasons” which justify high, confiscatory 
tax rates for high income individuals, as emphasised in Piketty, Saez, and Stantcheva 
(2014). In the case where those top incomes result from disproportionate and 
unproductive bargaining power, high tax rates for top income individuals can serve as a 
corrective, reducing incentives for this kind of bargaining. Evaluating whether this is 
the situation in South Africa is again not considered in this study, but it may be a 
relevant factor in deciding tax rates.  
Lastly, we must consider that while the personal income tax system serves a very 
important role in ensuring that the fiscal policy is fair and equitable, its capacity to 
combat the scale of economic inequality present in South Africa simply may be limited. 
Since decompositions of income inequality (Leibbrandt, Finn, and Woolard, 2012) show 
that the main driver of income inequality in South Africa is the labour market, labour 
market interventions which increase the earnings of low income individuals – such as a 
national minimum wage – may prove to have increased importance in the time to come. 
7.4 Combined negative income tax and personal income tax proposals 
Ideally, a negative income tax and personal income tax could be thought of in 
combination, with the latter paying for the former. Unfortunately, as we saw in chapter 
4 and 5, a negative income tax of the suggested size cannot realistically be fully financed 
through personal income tax. There are too few taxpayers at the top end of the income 
distribution relative to the number of poor. Hence, if one wanted to implement a 
negative income tax, one is faced with a dilemma. Either the scope of the negative 
income tax must be reduced to fit what can be realistically financed through the 
personal income tax system (as explored in chapter 6), or the funds for it must be found 
elsewhere. Since the impact of the negative income tax is heavily dependent on its size, 
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one financed by personal income tax has a much smaller impact on poverty and 
inequality, and is therefore not entirely satisfactory. 
This suggests that it might be necessary to look towards other ways of financing a 
negative income tax. One option worth considering is raising the value-added tax rate. 
The value-added tax, which is set at 14%, is mildly progressive (The National Treasury 
of South Africa, 2016). However, Inchauste et al. (2015) note that if zero-rated basic foods 
were subjected to the 14% rating, the VAT would be regressive. As such, increasing the 
VAT is a less than ideal option in terms of progressivity, but it has revenue-increasing 
potential. The 2016 Budget Review notes that there may be “room to increase indirect 
taxes, such as VAT”, but that “any such changes would need to be accompanied by 
measures to improve the pro-poor character of expenditure” (The National Treasury of 
South Africa, 2016). The negative income tax may fit that bill.  
7.4 Concluding remarks 
Pathways for future research can be easily imagined. In particular, simulations of the 
negative income tax and personal income tax which incorporate behavioural effects 
could give a better picture of how these policies would work in reality. Similarly, given 
that it tends to better capture high income earners, simulating changes in top tax rates 
using tax data might improve the results of the top tax simulations. Furthermore, it 
could be interesting to explore a South African negative income tax which especially 
attempts to increase work incentives by having a low implicit tax rate. A fiscal incidence 
analysis which looks at the trade-offs of a VAT-financed negative income tax would also 
be relevant. Lastly, any detailed analysis of the origins of top incomes in South Africa 
could be interesting, as could studies that explore the intersection between economics 
and other social sciences to look at the connection between tax, fairness, and social 
justice in the South African context. 
While these are all worthy extensions, this dissertation has shown the potential of, and 
limitations to, increasing the progressivity of the South African personal income tax 
system. In particular, it has shown the potential of the negative income tax to deal with 
the dual challenges of poverty and income inequality. It remains clear, however, that 
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any such policy necessitates serious financial and political commitment from the South 
African government, and that the discourse moves from whether the country can afford 
to make such a commitment to – as Mr Skweyiya pointed out – whether it can afford 
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1996 tax year (1 March 1995 - 28 February 1996) 1997 tax year (1 March 1996 - 28 February 1997)
Taxable income (R)​ ​Rates of tax (R) ​Taxable income (R) ​Rates of tax (R)
0 - 5 000 17% of each R1 0 - 15 000 17 % of each R1
5 001 - 10 000
R850 + 18% of the amount over 
R5 000 15 001 - 20 000
R2 550 + 19% of the amount 
over R15 000
10 001 - 15 000
R1 750 + 19% of the amount 
over R10 000 20 001 - 30 000
R3 500 + 21% of the amount 
over R20 000
15 001 - 20 000
R2 700 + 20% of the amount 
over R15 000 30 001 - 40 000
R5 600 + 30% of the amount 
over R30 000
20 001 - 30 000
R3 700 + 21% of the amount 
over R20 000 40 001 - 60 000
R8 800 + 41% of the amount 
over R40 000
30 001 - 40 000
R5 800 + 31% of the amount 
over R30 000 60 001 - 80 000
R18 500 + 43% of the amount 
over R60 000
40 001 - 50 000 
R8 900 + 42% of the amount 
over R40 000 80 001 - 100 000 
R25 400 + 44% of the amount 
over R80 000
50 001 - 70 000
R13 000 + 43% of the amount 
over R50 000 100 001 and over 
R34 200 + 45% of the amount 
over R100 000
70 001 - 80 000
R21 700 + 44% of the amount 
over R70 000
80 001 and over
26 100 + 45% of the amount 
over R80 000 
Tax rebates Tax rebates
Primary R 2 625 Primary R 2 680
Secondary R 2 500 Secondary R 2 500
Tertiary - Tertiary -
Tax treshold Tax treshold
Below age 65 R 14 600 Below age 65 R 15 580
Age 65 and over R 28 785 Age 65 and over R 27 905
Age 75 and over - Age 75 and over -
Medical aid rebates Medical aid rebates
Self Self
1st dependant 1st dependant






1998 tax year (1 March 1997 - 28 February 1998) 1999 tax year (1 March 1998 - 28 February 1999)
​Taxable income (R) ​Rates of tax (R) ​Taxable income (R) ​Rates of tax (R)
0 – 30 000 19% of each R1 0 – 31 000 19% of each R1
30 001 – 35 000 
R5 700 + 30% of the amount 
above R30 000 31 001 – 46 000 
R5 890 + 30% of the amount above 
31 000
35 001 – 45 000
 R7 200 + 32% of the amount 
above R35 000 46 001 – 60 000 
R10 390 + 39% of the amount 
above 46 000
45 001 – 60 000
 R10 400 + 41% of the amount 
above R45 000 60 001- 70 000
R15 850 + 43 % of the amount 
above 60 000
60 001 – 70 000
 R16 550 + 43% of the amount 
above R60 000 70 001 - 120 000
R 20 150 + 44% of the amount 
above 70 000
70 001 – 100 000
 R20 850 + 44% of the amount 
above R70 000 120 001 and above
R42 150 + 45% of the amount 
above 120 000
100 001 and above 
R34 050 + 45% of the amount 
above R100 000
Tax rebates
Primary R 3 515
Secondary R 3 660
Tertiary -
Tax rebates
Primary R 3 215 Tax treshold
Secondary R 2 500 Below age 65 R 18 500
Tertiary - Age 65 and over R 31 950
Age 75 and over -
Tax treshold
Below age 65 R 16 921 Medical aid rebates
Age 65 and over R 30 050 Self









2000 tax year (1 March 1999 - 28 February 2000) 2001 tax year (1 March 2000 - 28 February 2001)
Taxable income (R)​ ​Rates of tax (R) ​Taxable income (R) ​Rates of tax (R)
 0 – 33 000 19% of each R1 0 - 35 000 18% of each R1
33 001 – 50 000 
R6 270 + 30% of the amount 
above R33 000 35 001 - 45 000
R6 300 + 26% of the amount 
above R35 000
50 001 - 60 000
R11 370 + 35% of the amount 
above R50 000 45 001 - 60 000
R8 900 + 32% of the amount 
above R45 000
60 001 - 70 000
R14 870 + 40 % of the amount 
above R60 000 60 001 - 70 000
R13 700 + 37% of the amount 
above R60 000
70 001 - 120 000
R18 870 + 44% of the amount 
above R70 000 70 001 - 200 000
R17 400 + 40% of the amount 
above R70 000
120 001 and above
R40 870 + 45% of the amount 
above R120 000 200 001 and above
R69 400 + 42% of the amount 
above R200 000
Tax rebates Tax rebates
Primary R 3 710 Primary R 3 800
Secondary R 2 775 Secondary R 2 900
Tertiary - Tertiary -
Tax treshold Tax treshold
Below age 65 R 19 526 Below age 65 R 21 111
Age 65 and over R 33 717 Age 65 and over R 36 538
Age 75 and over - Age 75 and over -
Medical aid rebates Medical aid rebates
Self Self
1st dependant 1st dependant





2002 tax year (1 March 2001 - 28 February 2002) 2003 tax year (1 March 2002 - 28 February 2003)
​Taxable income (R) ​Rates of tax (R) Taxable income (R)​ ​Rates of tax (R)
0 - 38 000 18 % of each R1 0 - 40 000 18% of each R1 
38 001 - 55 000
R 6 840 + 26% of the amount 
above R38 000 40 001 - 80 000
R 7 200 + 25% of the amount 
above R40 000
55 001 - 80 000
R 11 260 + 32% of the amount 
above R55 000 80 001 - 110 000
R 17 200 + 30% of the amount 
above R80 000
80 001 - 100 000
R 19 260 + 37% of the amount 
above R80 000 110 001 - 170 000
R 26 200 + 35% of the amount 
above R110 000
100 001 - 215 000
R26 660 + 40% of the amount 
above R100 000 170 001 - 240 000
R47 200 + 38% of the amount 
above R170 000
215 001 and above
R72 660 + 42% of the amount 
above R215 000 240 001 and above
R73 800 + 40% of the amount 
above R240 000
Tax rebates Tax rebates
Primary R 4 140 Primary R 4 860
Secondary R 3 000 Secondary R 3 000
Tertiary - Tertiary -
Tax treshold Tax treshold
Below age 65 R 23 000 Below age 65 R 27 000
Age 65 and over R 39 154 Age 65 and over R 42 640
Age 75 and over - Age 75 and over -
Medical aid rebates Medical aid rebates
Self Self
2nd dependant 3rd dependant





2004 tax year (1 March 2003 - 28 February 2004) 2005 tax year (1 March 2004 - 28 February 2005)
​Taxable income (R) ​Rates of tax (R) ​Taxable income (R) ​Rates of tax (R)
0 - 70 000 18% of each R1 0 - 74 000 18% of each R1
70 001 - 110 000
R12 600 + 25% of the amount 
above R70 000 74 001 - 115 000
R13 320 + 25% of the amount 
above R74 000
110 001 - 140 000
R22 600 + 30% of the amount 
above R110 000 115 001 - 155 000
R23 570 + 30% of the amount 
above R115 000
140 001 - 180 000
R31 600 + 35% of the amount 
above R140 000 155 001 - 195 000
R35 570 + 35% of the amount 
above R155 000
180 001 - 255 000
R45 600 + 38% of the amount 
above R180 000 195 001 - 270 000
R49 570 + 38% of the amount 
above R195 000
255 001 and above
R74 100 + 40% of the amount 
above R255 000 270 001 and above
R78 070 + 40% of the amount 
above R270 000
Tax rebates Tax rebates
Primary R 5 400 Primary R 5 800
Secondary R 3 100 Secondary R 3 200
Tertiary - Tertiary -
Tax treshold Tax treshold
Below age 65 R 30 000 Below age 65 R 32 222
Age 65 and over R 47 222 Age 65 and over R 50 000
Age 75 and over - Age 75 and over -
Medical aid rebates Medical aid rebates
Self Self
1st dependant 1st dependant





Taxable income (R)​ ​Rates of tax (R) ​Taxable income (R) ​Rates of tax (R)
0 - 80 000 18% of each R1 0 - 100 000 18% of each R1
80 001 - 130 000
R14 400 + 25% of the amount 
above R80 000 100 001 - 160 000
R18 000 + 25% of the amount 
above R100 000
130 001 - 180 000
R26 900 + 30% of the amount 
above R130 000 160 001 - 220 000
R33 000 + 30% of the amount 
above R160 000
180 001 - 230 000
R41 900 + 35% of the amount 
above R180 000 220 001 - 300 000
R51 000 + 35% of the amount 
above R220 000
230 001 - 300 000
R59 400 + 38% of the amount 
above R230 000 300 001 - 400 000
R79 000 + 38% of the amount 
above R300 000
300 001 and above
R86 000 + 40% of the amount 
above R300 000 400 001 and above
R117 000 + 40% of the amount 
above R400 000
Tax rebates Tax rebates
Primary R 6 300 Primary R 7 200
Secondary R 4 500 Secondary R 4 500
Tertiary - Tertiary -
Tax treshold Tax treshold
Below age 65 R 35 000 Below age 65 R 40 000
Age 65 and over R 60 000 Age 65 and over R 65 000
Age 75 and over - Age 75 and over -
Medical aid rebates Medical aid rebates
Self Self
1st dependant 1st dependant
Additional dependants Additional dependants





Taxable income (R)​ ​Rates of tax (R) ​Taxable income (R) ​Rates of tax (R)
0 - 112 500 18% of each R1 0 - 122 000 18% of each R1
112 501 - 180 000
R20 250 + 25% of the amount 
above R112 500 122 001 - 195 000
R21 960 + 25% of the amount 
above R122 000
180 001 - 250 000
R37 125 + 30% of the amount 
above R180 000 195 001 - 270 000
R40 210 + 30% of the amount 
above R195 000
250 001 - 350 000
R58 125 + 35% of the amount 
above R250 000 270 001 - 380 000
R62 710 + 35% of the amount 
above R270 000
350 001 - 450 000
R93 125 + 38% of the amount 
above R350 000 380 001 - 490 000
R101 210 + 38% of the amount 
above R380 000
450 001 and above
R131 125 + 40% of the amount 
above R450 000 490 001 and above
R143 010 + 40% of the amount 
above R490 000
Tax rebates Tax rebates
Primary R 7 740 Primary R 8 280
Secondary R 4 680 Secondary R 5 040
Tertiary - Tertiary -
Tax treshold Tax treshold
Below age 65 R 43 000 Below age 65 R 46 000
Age 65 and over R 69 000 Age 65 and over R 74 000
Age 75 and over - Age 75 and over -
Medical aid rebates Medical aid rebates
Self Self
2nd dependant 3rd dependant
Additional dependants Additional dependants





​Taxable income (R) ​Rates of tax (R) ​Taxable income (R) ​Rates of tax (R)
0 - 132 000 18% of each R1 0 - 140 000 18% of each R1
132 001 - 210 000
R23 760 + 25% of the amount 
above R132 000 140 001 - 221 000
R25 200 + 25% of the amount 
above R140 000
210 001 - 290 000
R43 260 + 30% of the amount 
above R210 000 221 001 - 305 000 
R45 450 + 30% of the amount 
above R221 000
290 001 - 410 000
R67 260 + 35% of the amount  
above R290 000 305 001 - 431 000
R70 650 + 35% of the amount 
above R305 000
410 001 - 525 000
R109 260 + 38% of the amount 
above R410 000 431 001 - 552 000
R114 750 + 38% of the amount 
above R431 000
525 001 and above
R152 960 + 40% of the amount 
above R525 000 552 001 and above
R160 730 + 40% of the amount 
above R552 000
Tax rebates Tax rebates
Primary R 9 756 Primary R 10 260
Secondary R 5 400 Secondary R 5 675
Tertiary - Tertiary -
Tax treshold Tax treshold
Below age 65 R 54 200 Below age 65 R 57 000
Age 65 and over R 84 200 Age 65 and over R 88 528
Age 75 and over - Age 75 and over -
Medical aid rebates Medical aid rebates
Self Self
1st dependant 1st dependant
Additional dependants Additional dependants





2013 tax year (1 March 2012 - 28 February 2013)
Taxable income (R)​ ​Rates of tax (R) ​Taxable income (R) ​Rates of tax (R)
​0 - 150 000 ​18% of each R1 ​0 - 160 000 ​18% of each R1
150 001 - 235 000
​27 000 + 25% of the amount 
above 150 000 ​160 001 - 250 000
​28 800 + 25% of the amount 
above 160 000
235 001 - 325 000
48 250 + 30% of the amount 
above 235 000 ​250 001 - 346 000
​51 300 + 30% of the amount 
above 250 000
325 001 - 455 000
75 250 + 35% of the amount 
above 325 000 ​346 001 - 484 000
​80 100 + 35% of the amount 
above 346 000
455 001 - 580 000
​120 750 + 38% of the amount 
above 455 000 ​484 001 - 617 000
​128 400 + 38% of the amount 
above 484 000
580 001 and above
​168 250 + 40% of the amount 
above 580 000 ​617 001 and above
​178 940 + 40% of the amount 
above 617 000
Tax rebates Tax rebates
Primary ​R10 755 Primary ​R11 440
Secondary ​R6 012 Secondary ​R6 390
Tertiary ​R2 000 Tertiary ​R2 130
Tax treshold Tax treshold
Below age 65 R 59 750 Below age 65 ​R63 556
Age 65 and over R 93 150 Age 65 and over ​R99 056
Age 75 and over R 104 261 Age 75 and over ​R110 889
Medical aid rebates Medical aid rebates
Self Self ​R230
1st dependant 1st dependant ​R230
Additional dependants Additional dependants ​R154





Taxable income (R)​ ​Rates of tax (R) ​Taxable income (R) ​Rates of tax (R)
​0 - 165 600 ​18% of each R1 0 - 174 550​ ​18% of each R1
​165 601 - 258 750
​29 808 + 25% of the amount 
above 165 600 ​174 551 - 272 700
​31 419 + 25% of the amount 
above 174 550
​258 751 - 358 110
​53 096 + 30% of the amount 
above 258 750 ​272 701 - 377 450
​55 957 +30% of the amount 
above 272 700
​358 111 - 500 940
​82 904 + 35% of the amount 
above 358 110 ​377 451 - 528 000
​87 382 + 35% of the amount 
above 377 450
​500 941 - 638 600
​132 894 +38% of the amount 
above 500 940 ​528 001 - 673 100
​140 074 +38% of the amount 
above 528 000
​638 601 and above
​185 205 + 40% of the amount 
above 638 600 ​673 101 and above
​195 212 + 40% of the amount 
above 673 100
Tax rebates Tax rebates
Primary ​R12 080 Primary ​R12 726
Secondary ​R6 750 Secondary ​R7 110
Tertiary ​R2 250 Tertiary ​R2 367
Tax treshold Tax treshold
Below age 65 ​R67 111 Below age 65 ​R70 700
Age 65 and over ​R104 611 Age 65 and over ​R110 200
Age 75 and over ​R117 111 Age 75 and over ​R123 350
Medical aid rebates Medical aid rebates
Self ​R242 Self ​R257
2nd dependant ​R242 3rd dependant R​257
Additional dependants ​R162 Additional dependants ​R172











​Taxable income (R) ​Rates of tax (R) ​Taxable income (R) ​Rates of tax (R)
​0 - 181 900 ​18% of each R1 0 – 188 000 18% of taxable income
​181 901 - 284 100
​32 742 + 26% of the amount 
above 181 900 188 001 – 293 600
33 840 + 26% of taxable income 
above 188 000
​284 101 - 393 200
​59 314 + 31% of the amount 
above 284 100 293 601 – 406 400
61 296 + 31% of taxable income 
above 293 600
​393 201 - 550 100
​93 135 + 36% of the amount 
above 393 200 406 401 – 550 100
96 264 + 36% of taxable income 
above 406 400
​550 101 - 701 300
​149 619 + 39% of the amount 
above 550 100 550 101 – 701 300
147 996 + 39% of taxable income 
above 550 100
​701 301 and above
​208 587 + 41% of the amount 
above 701 300 701 301 and above
206 964 + 41% of taxable income 
above 701 300
Tax rebates Tax rebates
Primary ​R13 257 Primary ​R13 500
Secondary ​R7 407 Secondary ​R7 407
Tertiary ​R2 466 Tertiary ​R2 466
Tax treshold Tax treshold
Below age 65 ​R73 650 Below age 65 ​R75 000
Age 65 and over ​R114 800 Age 65 and over ​R116 150
Age 75 and over ​R128 500 Age 75 and over ​R129 850
Medical aid rebates Medical aid rebates
Self R270 Self ​R286
1st dependant ​R270 1st dependant ​R286
Additional dependants ​R181 Additional dependants ​R192
2017 tax year (1 March 2016 - 28 February 2017)2016 tax year (1 March 2015 - 29 February 2016)
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Appendix B: Tax code 1996-2017, 
adjusted for inflation 
 
  
1996 tax year (1 March 1995 - 28 February 1996) 1997 tax year (1 March 1996 - 28 February 1997)
Taxable income (R)​ ​Rates of tax (R) ​Taxable income (R) ​Rates of tax (R)
0 - 15 975 17% of each R1 0 - 44 688 17 % of each R1
15 976 - 31 950
R2 716 + 18% of the amount 
over R15 975 44 689 - 59 584 
R7 597 + 19% of the amount 
over R44 688
31 951 - 47 925
R5 591 + 19% of the amount 
over R31 950 59 585 - 89 377
R10 427 + 21% of the amount 
over R59 584
47 926 - 63 900
R8 627 + 20% of the amount 
over R47 925 89 378 - 119 169
R16 684 + 30% of the amount 
over R89 377
63 901 - 95 850
R11 821 + 21% of the amount 
over R63 900 119 170 - 178 753
R26 217 + 41% of the amount 
over R119 169
95 851 - 127 799
R18 531 + 31% of the amount 
over R95 850 178 754 - 238 338
R55 116 + 43% of the amount 
over R178 753
127 800 - 159 749
R28 435 + 42% of the amount 
over R127 799 238 339 - 297 922
R75 672 + 44% of the amount 
over R238 338
159 750 - 223 649
R41  535 + 43% of the amount 
over R159 749 297 922 and over 
R101 889 + 45% of the amount 
over R297 922
223 650 - 255 599
R69 331 + 44% of the amount 
over R223 649
255 600 and over
83 389 + 45% of the amount 
over R255 599
Tax rebates Tax rebates
Primary R 8 387 Primary R 7 984
Secondary R 7 987 Secondary R 7 448
Tertiary - Tertiary -
Tax treshold Tax treshold
Below age 65 R 46 647 Below age 65 R 46 416
Age 65 and over R 91 968 Age 65 and over R 83 135
Age 75 and over - Age 75 and over -
Medical aid rebates Medical aid rebates
Self Self
1st dependant 1st dependant





1998 tax year (1 March 1997 - 28 February 1998) 1999 tax year (1 March 1998 - 28 February 1999)
​Taxable income (R) ​Rates of tax (R) ​Taxable income (R) ​Rates of tax (R)
0 – 82 124 19% of each R1 0 – 79 368 19% of each R1
82 125 - 95 812
R15 604 + 30% of the amount 
above R82 124 79 369 – 117 772  
R15 080 + 30% of the amount 
above 79 368
95 813 - 123 186
 R19 710 + 32% of the amount 
above R95 812 117 773 – 153 616
R26 601 + 39% of the amount 
above117 772
123 187 - 164 248
 R28 470 + 41% of the amount 
above R123 186 153 617 - 179 219
R40 580 + 43 % of the amount 
above 153 616
164 248 - 191 623
 R43 305 + 43% of the amount 
above R164 248 179 220 - 307 232
R51 589 + 44% of the amount 
above 179 219
191 624 - 273 747
 R57 076 + 44% of the amount 
above R191 623 307 233 and above
R107 915+ 45% of the amount 
above 307 232
273 748 and above
R93 211 + 45% of the amount 
above R273 747
Tax rebates Tax rebates
Primary R 8 801 Primary R 8 999
Secondary R 6 844 Secondary R 9 371
Tertiary - Tertiary -
Tax treshold Tax treshold
Below age 65 R 46 321 Below age 65 R 47 365
Age 65 and over R 82 261 Age 65 and over R 81 801
Age 75 and over - Age 75 and over -
Medical aid rebates Medical aid rebates
Self Self
2nd dependant 3rd dependant





2000 tax year (1 March 1999 - 28 February 2000) 2001 tax year (1 March 2000 - 28 February 2001)
Taxable income (R)​ ​Rates of tax (R) ​Taxable income (R) ​Rates of tax (R)
 0 – 80 363 19% of each R1 0 - 80 938 18% of each R1
80 364 - 121 762 
R15 269 + 30% of the amount 
above R80 363 80 939 - 104 063 
R14 569 + 26% of the amount 
above R80 938
121 763 - 146 115
R27 689 + 35% of the amount 
above R121 762 104 064 - 138 750
R20 581 + 32% of the amount 
above R104 063
146 116 - 170 467
R36 212 + 40 % of the amount 
above R146 115 138 751 - 161 875
R31  681 + 37% of the amount 
above R138 750
170 468 - 292 229
R45 953 + 44% of the amount 
above R170 467 161  876 - 462 500
R40 238 + 40% of the amount 
above R161 875
292 230 and above
R99 528 + 45% of the amount 
above R292 229 462 501 and above
R160 488 + 42% of the amount 
above R462 500
Tax rebates Tax rebates
Primary R 9 035 Primary R 8 788
Secondary R 6 758 Secondary R 6 706
Tertiary - Tertiary -
Tax treshold Tax treshold
Below age 65 R 47 551 Below age 65 R 48 819
Age 65 and over R 82 109 Age 65 and over R 84 494
Age 75 and over - Age 75 and over -
Medical aid rebates Medical aid rebates
Self Self
1st dependant 1st dependant





2002 tax year (1 March 2001 - 28 February 2002) 2003 tax year (1 March 2002 - 28 February 2003)
​Taxable income (R) ​Rates of tax (R) Taxable income (R)​ ​Rates of tax (R)
0 - 83 179 18 % of each R1 0 - 80 210 18% of each R1 
83 180 - 120 391
R14 972 + 26% of the amount 
above R83 179 80 211 - 160 420
R14 438 + 25% of the amount 
above R80 210
120 392 - 175 115
R24 647 + 32% of the amount 
above R120 391 160 421 - 220 577
R34 490 + 30% of the amount 
above R160 420
175 116 - 218 893
R42 159 + 37% of the amount 
above R175 115 220 578 - 340 892
R52 537 + 35% of the amount 
above R220 577
218 894 - 470 620
R58 357 + 40% of the amount 
above R218 893 340 893 - 481 259
R94 648 + 38% of the amount 
above R340 892
470 621 and above
R159 048 + 42% of the amount 
above R470 620 481 260 and above
R147 987+ 40% of the amount 
above R481 259
Tax rebates Tax rebates
Primary R 9 062 Primary R 9 745
Secondary R 6 567 Secondary R 6 016
Tertiary - Tertiary -
Tax treshold Tax treshold
Below age 65 R 50 345 Below age 65 R 54 142
Age 65 and over R 85 705 Age 65 and over R 85 504
Age 75 and over - Age 75 and over -
Medical aid rebates Medical aid rebates
Self Self
2nd dependant 3rd dependant





2004 tax year (1 March 2003 - 28 February 2004) 2005 tax year (1 March 2004 - 28 February 2005)
​Taxable income (R) ​Rates of tax (R) ​Taxable income (R) ​Rates of tax (R)
0 - 132 711 18% of each R1 0 - 138 238 18% of each R1
132 712 - 208 545 
R23 888 + 25% of the amount 
above R132 711 138 239 - 214 829
R24 883 + 25% of the amount 
above R138 238
208 546 - 265 421
R42 847 + 30% of the amount 
above R208 545 214 830 - 289 552 
R44 031 + 30% of the amount 
above R214 829
265 422 - 341 256
R59 909 + 35% of the amount 
above R265 421 289 553 - 364 275 
R66 448 + 35% of the amount 
above R289 552
341 257 - 483 446 
R86 452 + 38% of the amount 
above R341 256 364 276 - 504 381 
R92 601 + 38% of the amount 
above R364 275
483 447 and above
R140 484 + 40% of the amount 
above R483 446 504 382 and above
R145 841 + 40% of the amount 
above R504 381
Tax rebates Tax rebates
Primary R 10 238 Primary R 10 835
Secondary R 5 877 Secondary R 5 978
Tertiary - Tertiary -
Tax treshold Tax treshold
Below age 65 R 56 876 Below age 65 R 60 193
Age 65 and over R 89 527 Age 65 and over R 93 404
Age 75 and over - Age 75 and over -
Medical aid rebates Medical aid rebates
Self Self
1st dependant 1st dependant





Taxable income (R)​ ​Rates of tax (R) ​Taxable income (R) ​Rates of tax (R)
0 -144 732 18% of each R1 0 - 172 741 18% of each R1
144 733 - 235 189
R26 052 + 25% of the amount 
above R144 732 172 742- 276 386 
R31 093 + 25% of the amount 
above R172 741
235 190 - 325 647
R48 666 + 30% of the amount 
above R235 189 276 387 - 380 030
R57 005 + 30% of the amount 
above R276 386
325 648 - 416 104 
R75 803 + 35% of the amount 
above R325 647 380 031 - 518 223 
R88 098 + 35% of the amount 
above R380 030
416 105 - 542 744
R107 463 + 38% of the amount 
above R416 104 518 224 - 690 964
R136 465+ 38% of the amount 
above R518 223
542 745 and above
R155 587 + 40% of the amount 
above R542 744 690 965 and above
R202 107 + 40% of the amount 
above R690 964
Tax rebates Tax rebates
Primary R 11 398 Primary R 12 437
Secondary R 8 141 Secondary R 7 773
Tertiary - Tertiary -
Tax treshold Tax treshold
Below age 65 R 63 320 Below age 65 R 69 096
Age 65 and over R 108 549 Age 65 and over R 112 282
Age 75 and over - Age 75 and over -
Medical aid rebates Medical aid rebates
Self Self
1st dependant 1st dependant
Additional dependants Additional dependants





Taxable income (R)​ ​Rates of tax (R) ​Taxable income (R) ​Rates of tax (R)
0 - 181 487 18% of each R1 0 - 176 462 18% of each R1
181 488 - 290 380
R32 668 + 25% of the amount 
above R181 487 176 463 - 282 049
R31 763 + 25% of the amount 
above R176 462
290 381 - 403 305 
R59 891 + 30% of the amount 
above R290 380 282 050 - 390 530
R58 160 + 30% of the amount 
above R282 049
403 306 - 564 627
R93 768 + 35% of the amount 
above R403 305 390 531 - 549 634
R90 704 + 35% of the amount 
above R390 530
564 628 - 725 949 
R150 231 + 38% of the amount 
above R564 627 549 635 - 708 739
R146 391 + 38% of the amount 
above R549 634
725 950 and above
R211 534+ 40% of the amount 
above R725 949 708 740 and above
R206 851 + 40% of the amount 
above R708 739
Tax rebates Tax rebates
Primary R 12 486 Primary R 11 976
Secondary R 7 550 Secondary R 7 290
Tertiary - Tertiary -
Tax treshold Tax treshold
Below age 65 R 69 368 Below age 65 R 66 535
Age 65 and over R 111 312 Age 65 and over R 107 034
Age 75 and over - Age 75 and over -
Medical aid rebates Medical aid rebates
Self Self
2nd dependant 3rd dependant
Additional dependants Additional dependants





​Taxable income (R) ​Rates of tax (R) ​Taxable income (R) ​Rates of tax (R)
0 - 178 965 18% of each R1 0 - 182 063 18% of each R1
178 966 - 284 716
R32 214 + 25% of the amount 
above R178 965 182 064 - 287 400
R32 771 + 25% of the amount 
above R182 063
284 717 - 393 180
R57 431 + 30% of the amount 
above R284 716 287 401 - 396 638
R59 106 + 30% of the amount 
above R287 400
393 181 - 555 875 
R91 191 + 35% of the amount  
above R393 180 396 639 - 560 495
R91 877 + 35% of the amount 
above R396 638
555 876 - 711 791
R148 134 + 38% of the amount 
above R555 875 560 496 - 717 850
R149 227 + 38% of the amount 
above R560 495
711 792 and above 
R207 382 + 40% of the amount 
above R711 791 717 851 and above
R209 022 + 40% of the amount 
above R717 850
Tax rebates Tax rebates
Primary R 13 227 Primary R 13 343
Secondary R 7 321 Secondary R 7 380
Tertiary - Tertiary -
Tax treshold Tax treshold
Below age 65 R 73 484 Below age 65 R 74 126
Age 65 and over R 114 158 Age 65 and over R 115 127
Age 75 and over - Age 75 and over -
Medical aid rebates Medical aid rebates
Self Self
1st dependant 1st dependant
Additional dependants Additional dependants





2013 tax year (1 March 2012 - 28 February 2013)
Taxable income (R)​ ​Rates of tax (R) ​Taxable income (R) ​Rates of tax (R)
​0 - 185 799 ​18% of each R1 ​0 - 187 648 ​18% of each R1
185 800 - 291 085
33 444 + 25% of the amount 
above 185 799 187 649 - 293 200
33 777 + 25% of the amount 
above 187 648
291 086 - 402 565
59 765 + 30% of the amount 
above 291 085 293 201 - 405 789
60 165 + 30% of the amount 
above 293 200
402 566 - 563 591
93 209 + 35% of the amount 
above 402 565 405 790 - 567 636
93 941 + 35% of the amount 
above 405 789
563 592 - 718 423
​149 568 + 38% of the amount 
above 563 591 567 637 - 723 619
150 588 + 38% of the amount 
above 567 636
718 424 and above
208 405 + 40% of the amount 
above 718 423 723 620 and above
209 861 + 40% of the amount 
above 723 619
Tax rebates Tax rebates
Primary R 13 322 Primary ​R13 417
Secondary ​R7 447 Secondary ​R7 494
Tertiary ​R2 477 Tertiary ​R2 498
Tax treshold Tax treshold
Below age 65 R 74 010 Below age 65 ​R74 539
Age 65 and over R 115 381 Age 65 and over ​R116 173
Age 75 and over R129 144 Age 75 and over ​R130 051
Medical aid rebates Medical aid rebates
Self Self 270
1st dependant 1st dependant 270
Additional dependants Additional dependants 181





Taxable income (R)​ ​Rates of tax (R) ​Taxable income (R) ​Rates of tax (R)
​0 - 183 697 ​18% of each R1 0 - 182 506 ​18% of each R1
183 698 - 287 027
33 066 + 25% of the amount 
above 183 697 182 507 - 285 129
32 851 + 25% of the amount 
above 182 506
287 028 - 397 246
58 899 + 30% of the amount 
above 287 027 285 130 - 394 654
58 507 +30% of the amount 
above 285 129
397 247 - 555 685
91 964 + 35% of the amount 
above 397 246 394 655 - 552 066 
91 365 + 35% of the amount 
above 394 654
555 686 - 708 389
​147 417 +38% of the amount 
above 555 685 552 067 - 703 779
146 458 +38% of the amount 
above 552 066 
708 390 and above
205 445 + 40% of the amount 
above 708 389 703 780 and above
204 110 + 40% of the amount 
above 703 779
Tax rebates Tax rebates
Primary ​R13 400 Primary R13 306
Secondary ​R7 488 Secondary R7 434
Tertiary ​R2 496 Tertiary R2 475
Tax treshold Tax treshold
Below age 65 ​R74 445 Below age 65 R73 922
Age 65 and over ​R116 043 Age 65 and over R115 223
Age 75 and over ​R129 909 Age 75 and over R128 972
Medical aid rebates Medical aid rebates
Self 268 Self 269
2nd dependant 268 3rd dependant 269
Additional dependants 180 Additional dependants 180





​Taxable income (R) ​Rates of tax (R) ​Taxable income (R) ​Rates of tax (R)
​0 - 181 900 ​18% of each R1 0 – 178 633 18% of taxable income
​181 901 - 284 100
​32 742 + 26% of the amount 
above 181 900 178 634 - 278 972
32 154 + 26% of taxable income 
above 178 633
​284 101 - 393 200
​59 314 + 31% of the amount 
above 284 100 278 973 - 386 152
58 242 + 31% of taxable income 
above 278 972
​393 201 - 550 100
​93 135 + 36% of the amount 
above 393 200 386 153 - 522 693 
91 468 + 36% of taxable income 
above 386 152
​550 101 - 701 300
​149 619 + 39% of the amount 
above 550 100 522 694 - 666 359
140 622 + 39% of taxable income 
above 522 693
​701 301 and above
​208 587 + 41% of the amount 
above 701 300 666 360 and above
196 653+ 41% of taxable income 
above 666 359
Tax rebates Tax rebates
Primary ​R13 257 Primary R12 827
Secondary ​R7 407 Secondary R7 038
Tertiary ​R2 466 Tertiary R2 343 
Tax treshold Tax treshold
Below age 65 ​R73 650 Below age 65 R71 263
Age 65 and over ​R114 800 Age 65 and over R110 363
Age 75 and over ​R128 500 Age 75 and over R123 381
Medical aid rebates Medical aid rebates
Self 270 Self 272
1st dependant 270 1st dependant 272
Additional dependants 181 Additional dependants 182
2016 tax year (1 March 2015 - 29 February 2016) 2017 tax year (1 March 2016 - 28 February 2017)
